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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the Russian intervention in Georgia and Ukraine, 
much of the international community characterized Russia as a 
revisionist power that gives no heed to international law.1  The Russian 
invasion provided a flashback to the Westphalian system2 in its full-
fledged military assault on Georgia and swift annexation of Crimea.  
The times have changed since the creation of the United Nations 
(UN), however.  The UN Charter was thought “to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war . . . [and] to ensure, by the 
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed 
force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”3  The question 
now becomes: how do Russia’s recent interventions relate to the UN 
legal order? The UN legal order, which Part II of this Comment defines 
in detail, provides states with a legal framework that arises from three 
 
* J.D., 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., International Relations and 
Political Science, 2012, Lehigh University.  I would like to thank Professor Kristen 
Boon for her support and invaluable guidance.  I would also like to thank Professor 
Christopher Borgen for his thoughtful feedback and Michael Spizzuco for his editing 
assistance. The views expressed in this Comment are mine alone. 
 1  In response to Russia’s intervention in Georgia, former U.S. Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, declared that “Russia’s reputation as a potential partner in 
international institutions, diplomatic, political, security, economic, is frankly, in 
tatters.”  Georgia Conflict: Key Statements, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
7556857.stm (last updated Aug. 19, 2008).  
 2  The doctrine of state sovereignty derives from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, 
which defined sovereignty as “absolute and perpetual power.”  Mikhail Antonov, The 
Philosophy of Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Democracy in Russia 5 (Nat’l Research Univ. 
Higher School Econ., Working Paper No. WP BRP 24/LAW/2013, 2013).  
 3  See U.N. Charter preamble, art. 2, ¶ 4 (codifying the prohibition on the use of 
force); Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 809 (1970) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul F. Diehl, 
Caution in What You Wish For: The Consequences of a Right to Democracy, 48 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 289, 312 (2012). 
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sources: (1) the UN Charter; (2) Security Council Resolutions; and (3) 
General Assembly Resolutions. 
Surprisingly to some, Russia purportedly values adherence to 
international law,4 and, consequently, sets forth carefully crafted 
arguments to justify its actions in Georgia and Ukraine.  Russia’s 
perspective on the UN Legal Order brings a level of rigor to 
international law that manifests itself in strict interpretations of the 
relevant underlying legal principles.  The problem remains that many 
other states do not share Russia’s stringent perspective. 
Like most states in the international system, Russia often behaves 
in accordance with its self-interest.  On September 3, 2008, then-
President Dmitry Medvedev announced that Russia had regions of 
“privileged interests” that “it will pay particular attention to.”5  Days 
later, President Medvedev further explained that Russia was not 
drawing spheres of influence, but would rather “work to extend [its] 
contacts with those nations with which [it has] traditionally been close, 
[and] with whom [it has] had warm relations.”6  Russia’s foreign policy 
in 2008 also made it clear that Russia would oppose North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement towards Russian borders, 
particularly noting concern with the incorporation of Ukraine and 
Georgia.7 
Officially, Russia purports to attach great importance to 
international law.8  Article 15 of the Russian Constitution states that 
“[t]he universally-recognized norms of international law and 
international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall 
be a component part of its legal system.”9  Additionally, the significance 
of international law was one of the five principles on which Russia 
 
 4  See Vladimir Baranovsky, Humanitarian Intervention: Russian Perspective, 2 
PUGWASH OCCASIONAL PAPERS, no. 1, 2001, at 13–14. 
 5  Michael Toomey, The August 2008 Battle of South Ossetia: Does Russia Have a Legal 
Argument for Intervention?, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 443, 473 (2009).  
 6  Id. at 473–74 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 7  See Angelika Nußberger, Russia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT’L 
L. ¶ 21 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online) (last updated Oct. 2013) [hereinafter, Russia 
Max Planck]; John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault, 93 FOREIGN 
AFF., no. 5, 2014, at 77, 79. 
 8  See Vladimir Putin, Address by President of the Russian Federation (Mar. 18, 
2014), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 [hereinafter, Putin’s 
Speech] (discussing how Russia behaved in accordance with international law with 
regard to the Crimean Crisis and how Western powers are hypocritical in their 
duplicitous perspective on international law); Baranovsky, supra note 4. 
 9  KONSTITUTSIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15 
(Russ.). 
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based its foreign policy in 2008.10  This was reiterated in Russia’s 
foreign policy in 2013, which was approved by President Vladimir 
Putin.11  Russia often makes more of an effort to justify its actions under 
international law than many other states, including the United States.12 
Russia’s efforts to justify its actions, however, should not be 
misconstrued to imply that Russia always obeys international law.  
“International law emerges from states’ pursuit of self-interested 
policies on the international stage.  International law is, in this sense, 
endogenous to state interests.  It is not a check on state self-interest; it is 
a product of state self-interest.”13  One reason for this might be that 
Russia’s legal justifications may reflect state interests more so than 
strict adherence to international law.  Even so, Russia’s legal arguments 
are probative in the formation of customary international law.14  
Russia’s unilateral attempts to break apart Georgian and Ukrainian 
territory represent recent test cases to study Russia’s interpretation of 
international law and the law of foreign intervention specifically. 
Adherence to the UN legal order15 is important as the system 
effectuated many progressive developments in international law.  In 
1997, Russia and China issued a joint statement calling for a 
strengthened UN legal order.16  The two states updated this document 
in 2005, recognizing the UN’s role as “irreplaceable” in the 
international system.17  So far, the UN legal order has achieved what it 
 
 10  The other principles include: (1) promoting a multipolar world; (2) 
maintaining friendly relations with other states; (3) paying particular attention to 
priority regions; and (4) protecting Russian citizens, no matter where they are.  See 
Russia Max Planck, supra note 7, at ¶ 1.  
 11  See Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Concept of the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation], UKAZY PREZIDENTA VLADIMIR PUTIN [Decree of 
Vladimir Putin] Feb. 12, 2013.  
 12  In the Kosovo context, Russia invoked legal rhetoric in its public statements 
condemning Kosovar independence.  The United States and the European Union, 
however, did not partake in legal analysis and instead merely repeated Kosovo’s sui 
generis and non-precedential character.  See Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law 
and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of 
Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2009).   
 13  JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005). 
 14  See generally JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS, ACTORS, 
PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH (2d ed., 2006) (examining customary 
international law formation). 
 15  See infra Part II. 
 16  DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, THE POSITIONS OF 
RUSSIA AND CHINA AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT CRISES, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BRIEFING PAPER (Mar. 2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433800/EXPO-SEDE_NT%282013%29433800_ 
EN.pdf. 
 17  Id. (citing China, Russia Issue Joint Statement on World Order, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
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set out to do: lessen the likelihood of major wars.  The UN legal order 
made the prohibition on the threat or use of force non-derogable, 
except in particular circumstances.18  The drafters of the UN Charter 
desired to create a collective security system to foster international 
stability.19  The rise of the UN legal order is associated with the growing 
rights of individuals under international law.20  Therefore, the 
maintenance of the UN legal order is important to sustain the positive 
developments.21  A state acting outside of that system can create 
potentially dangerous precedent. 
Russia’s voting behavior in the Security Council reflects its 
perspective on international law and the UN legal order in particular.  
Russia is a Permanent Five (P5) Member in the Security Council and 
thereby enjoys veto power over the passage of resolutions.  The 
Security Council is the cornerstone of the UN’s collective security 
system because it is specifically tasked with maintaining international 
peace and stability.22  Thus, the Security Council serves as the UN’s 
authoritative body interpreting the UN Charter and the law of 
international intervention.23  Russia’s conduct and voting record within 
the Security Council demonstrates the legal parameters Russia 
requires for intervention in foreign states.  Because Russia intervened 
in Georgia and Ukraine, these parameters must be analyzed to 
comprehensively understand the nuance in Russia’s legal arguments 
 
ONLINE, http://en.people.cn/200507/01/eng20050701_193636.html (last updated 
July 4, 2005)). 
 18  See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7; U.N. Charter art. 51; ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER, 
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, Article 2(4), at 106–28 (Simma 
ed., 1994); Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, 
Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 856 (2007) 
(explaining how the prohibition on the use of force is a jus cogens norm defined as “a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted”).  
 19  See Eugenia López-Jacoiste, The UN Collective Security System and its Relationship 
with Economic Sanctions and Human Rights, 14 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 273, 275 (2010).  
 20  See e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed., 2008); 
60 Ways the United Nations Makes a Difference, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/visitors/shared/documents/pdfs/Pub_Unite
d%20Nations_60%20ways.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2015) (discussing how UN human 
rights bodies investigate individual human rights abuses).  
 21  It is important to note, however, that although the UN legal order is not 
synonymous with international law, it incorporates and codifies many legal norms. 
 22  See U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 23  The four components of the UN legal order this Comment discusses infra Part 
II are all related to the law of intervention.  Territorial integrity and the principle of 
non-intervention set general standards against intervention.  Self-defense, 
responsibility to protect (R2P), and self-determination are reasons why the 
international community may intervene in a host state. 
MASTROIANNI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2016  8:30 PM 
2016] COMMENT 603 
for intervention in both states.  This Comment will use Russia’s attitude 
towards the recent intrastate conflicts in Libya and Syria as a measure 
of Russia’s legal stance on intervention in the Security Council. 
Considering the significance Russia attaches to international law, 
the question remains: do the legal justifications set forth by Russia 
regarding intervention in Georgia and Ukraine fit within the UN legal 
order?  This Comment answers in the negative with one caveat for 
Russian peacekeepers in Georgia,24  and it will discuss how Russia’s 
legal arguments for intervention are facially consistent with the UN 
legal order.  An in-depth analysis, however, yields opposite results.  In 
addition, this Comment will demonstrate how Russia’s legal 
justifications for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine are very 
different from the legal stance on intervention that Russia traditionally 
adopts within the Security Council. 
Part II of this Comment identifies the sources of the UN legal 
order and four of its components as a measure for analyzing Russia’s 
legal justifications.  These rules include: self-defense, self-
determination, responsibility to protect25 (R2P), and non-
intervention/territorial integrity.  Part III analyzes Russia’s legal 
perspective in the Security Council.  This Part will emphasize Russia’s 
traditional non-interventionist voting behavior by examining its action, 
or lack thereof, in Libya and Syria.  Part IV briefly examines the Kosovo 
conflict and Russia’s legal position against intervention and the 2008 
Kosovar declaration of independence.  It will also show how the 
conflict influenced Russia’s attitude on intervention today.  Part V 
discusses the Russian intervention of Georgia and Ukraine.  It 
identifies the legal arguments proffered by Russia to justify 
intervention and draws commonalities between the two conflicts.  
Additionally, Part V will scrutinize whether these legal arguments pass 
muster under the four UN legal order components discussed supra.  In 
conclusion, Part VI integrates the findings in Part V, ultimately 
showing that on a surface level, Russia’s legal arguments fit within the 
UN legal order.  Beyond a surface-level analysis, however, Part VI will 
demonstrate that the majority of these justifications are inconsistent 
with the UN legal order.  Finally, Part VI draws a distinction between 
Russia’s legal stance in the Security Council and how Russia operates 
 
 24  See infra Part V. 
 25  The R2P has not hardened into a rule of international law generally.  This 
Comment concerns the UN legal order, which is not synonymous with international 
law.  The rules within the UN legal order certainly overlap with rules under 
international law, but vary in some instances like R2P.  See infra Part II for a more in-
depth discussion about R2P and its status in the UN legal order. 
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independently, displaying the nuance in Russia’s perspective on 
international law and the UN legal order. 
II. UN LEGAL ORDER 
The UN arose out of the chaos created by two world wars and was 
established to prevent future war among member states and promote 
the peaceful settlement of disputes.26  To promote these goals, the UN 
formed the UN legal order, which provided states with a new 
framework to operate within.  For purposes of this Comment, the UN 
legal order is derived from three sources: (1) the UN Charter; (2) 
Security Council Resolutions; and (3) General Assembly Resolutions.27  
Together, these sources codified pre-existing international law circa 
1945 and also fostered the creation of new rules under international 
law. 
As mentioned supra, this Comment analyzes Russia’s legal 
justifications for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine using the four 
components infra to measure Russian compliance with the UN legal 
order.  Sub-part A discusses territorial integrity and the norm of non-
intervention.  Sub-part B identifies the right of states to act in self-
defense.  Sub-part C examines self-determination and its inherent 
tension with state sovereignty.28  Finally, Sub-part D addresses the 
recently formed R2P framework. 
A. Territorial Integrity and Non-Intervention 
The territorial integrity of states is the cornerstone of the UN legal 
order and is codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.29  Article 2(4) 
mandates all member states to “refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.”30  The scope of the prohibition 
on the use of force is comprehensive in outlawing all uses of physical 
force, except in particular cases such as self-defense and humanitarian 
 
 26  See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3.  See also GERD OBERLEITNER, 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT: LAW, PRACTICE, POLICY 40 (2015). 
 27  Although not binding upon member states, General Assembly resolutions 
reflect consensus amongst member states that is important to consider when 
identifying customary international law.  
 28  Pursuant to state sovereignty, the state itself has the ultimate authority over its 
domestic affairs.  Applied in a conservative manner, it would follow that states are the 
only legitimate players in international relations.  See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). 
 29  See Borgen, supra note 12, at 8.  
 30  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.  
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intervention.31  Therefore, the ban on the use of force preserves states’ 
territorial integrity against armed intervention by other states. 
Accordingly, the Security Council monopolizes the legitimate use 
of force pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The Security 
Council bears the responsibility to address any threats to the peace and 
security of the international community.32  The Security Council may 
use several tools to resolve a threat to the peace including non-forcible 
measures,33 provisional measures,34 and the use of force.35  Pursuant to 
Articles 25 and 48 of the UN Charter, all member states are required 
to carry out Security Council decisions.36  Moreover, these decisions 
prevail over any other legal obligations.37  Thus, the UN legal order 
strongly favors the Security Council to be used as the primary 
mechanism for resolving disputes with the use of force. 
The norm of non-intervention is also codified in Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter.38  The norm prohibits interference in the domestic 
affairs of other states.39  The General Assembly has further defined non-
intervention in several declarations including the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.40  Although territorial integrity and non-intervention seem to 
outlaw any use of force in international relations, there are certain 
circumstances described infra in which those rules are overridden. 
B. Self-Defense 
Due to the importance of Article 2(4), the UN Charter explicitly 
permits the use of force only in situations of Security Council 
authorization and self-defense.41  Article 51 preserves the right of 
 
 31  See U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51; James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of 
the Prohibition of the Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215, 229 (2011). 
 32  See U.N. Charter art. 39.  
 33  Id. at art. 41. 
 34  Id. at art. 40. 
 35  Id. at art. 42. 
 36  Id. at arts. 25, 48.  
 37  Id. at art. 103. 
 38  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”).   
 39  Id.  See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV), Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) 
[hereinafter, Friendly Relations Declaration]. 
 40  See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39. 
 41  Thomas H. Lee, The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect Civilians: A 
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member states to unilaterally defend against an attack until the 
Security Council takes adequate measures.42  Generally, the application 
of Article 51 only arises when four conditions are met: (1) when a 
significant armed attack occurs;43 (2) when the act of self-defense 
responds to an armed attacker or parties legally responsible for the 
attack; (3) when the response is necessary; and (4) when the response 
is proportional.44 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ or “the Court”) in 
Nicaragua v. United States elaborated upon the meaning of an armed 
attack in its application of Article 51, concluding that an armed attack 
occurs when a state sends either regular forces or armed bands to carry 
out an attack in the victim state.45  Even when Article 51 requirements 
are met, the right of self-defense only justifies a temporary and limited 
unilateral response from the aggrieved state.46  The strict requirements 
placed upon Article 51 exemplify the importance that the UN legal 
order attaches to the prohibition on the use of force.47 
There is a second, more limited, version of self-defense that allows 
a state to take unilateral action to protect its nationals: humanitarian 
rescue.48  Humanitarian rescue does not derive from the UN legal 
order; rather, it comes from customary international law.  
Nevertheless, this Comment includes it as a subset of the right to self-
defense because this is one of the legal arguments asserted by Russia 
to justify intervention.49 
When looking at state practice, it is clear that both before and 
after the UN’s creation, international law permitted states to take 
 
Reinterpretation, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 251, 256 (2014).  
 42  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 43  An imminent armed attack also satisfies this requirement.  Toomey, supra note 
5, at 457 (citing MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER & PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
172–73 (2008)). 
 44  See id. at 456 (citing O’CONNELL, supra note 43, at 171). 
 45  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27). 
 46  Ved P. Nanda, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights 
Activists?: The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International Law, 84 
AM. J. INT’L L. 494, 496 (1990). 
 47  See O’CONNELL, supra note 43, 178–79 (discussing how member states in fear of 
an armed attack should appeal to the Security Council to remedy perceived danger); 
Toomey, supra note 5, at 457. 
 48  Some authors categorize humanitarian rescue as a form of the responsibility to 
protect and a form of humanitarian intervention.  See Lee, supra note 41, at 253.  This 
paper classifies humanitarian rescue as a form of self-defense because it relates greatly 
to Russia’s legal arguments for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine.  
 49  See infra Part IV. 
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unilateral action in rescuing its nationals in danger abroad.50  Instead 
of an attack on a state’s territory triggering Article 51, this form of self-
defense is asserted on behalf of a state’s nationals in danger in another 
state.  Humanitarian rescue allows the use of force when undertaken 
to protect nationals abroad who face an imminent risk of death.51  
Moreover, the aggrieved state must exhaust all peaceful measures to 
resolve the situation prior to engaging in humanitarian rescue and act 
proportionally.52 
C. Self-Determination 
One of the principles upon which the UN was founded is the 
“principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”53  Self-
determination means people may “freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural 
development.”54  “People” is a term of art used to identify individuals 
that have “a separate culture, a separate language or ethnic origins 
different from the majority population in the State.”55 
Self-determination for a people living within a state outside of the 
decolonization process or foreign occupation entails enjoyment of 
minority rights, often referred to as “internal self-determination.”56  
Thus, the right to self-determination is fulfilled so long as the minority 
group retains the right to speak its own language, participate in the 
political community, and practice its culture.57  The right to self-
determination was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in the Friendly 
Relations Resolution passed in 1970.58 
When the minority group is not allowed these rights, however, 
international law is divided on what the legal remedies entail.  In 
extraordinary circumstances, independence of oppressed peoples 
within a state may be effectuated in accordance with the right to self-
 
 50  See generally Eric Engle, Humanitarian Intervention and Syria: Russia, the United 
States and International Law, 18 BARRY L. REV. 129, 154 (2012).  
 51  Lee, supra note 41, at 274.   
 52  Id.  
 53  U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.  
 54  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 55  Juliane Kokott, Human Rights Situation in Kosovo 19891999, in KOSOVO AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL ASSESSMENT (C. Tomuschat ed., 2002).  
 56  Borgen, supra note 12, at 9.  
 57  Id. at 8.  
 58  See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39. 
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determination.59  In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the ICJ opined that 
declarations of independence do not violate international law.60 
An inherent tension between territorial integrity and self-
determination exists within the UN legal order.  The UN Charter calls 
for both the preservation of state territorial integrity and the 
protection of individual rights under self-determination.61  This 
tension was understood by the General Assembly when it passed the 
Friendly Relations Resolution.62  After describing the right to self-
determination, the General Assembly was careful to note that 
“[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples.”63  Therefore, the right to self-determination is balanced 
with the parent state’s territorial integrity.   
The next logical step to a declaration of independence is 
secession, otherwise known as “external self-determination.”  This 
occurs when “peoples” break away from the former parent state 
seeking to create a new state or to incorporate with another state.  
Although not completely analogous to secession, international law 
does not authorize declarations of independence, nor does it explicitly 
prohibit it.64  Nevertheless, state practice shows that secession is 
typically allowed in the decolonization context and where a “people” 
is subject to alien subjugation.65  
Secessionist disputes are often analyzed under domestic law,66 but 
they can also implicate international law in certain circumstances.  
These circumstances include: (1) the new entity seeking recognition 
as a sovereign state; (2) the Security Council’s determining that the 
 
 59  William Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, Penn Law Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 14-24, 2 (2014). 
 60  See Timothy William Waters, Plucky Little Russia: Misreading the Georgian War 
Through the Distorting Lens of Aggression, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 176, 217 (2013).  
 61  See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.  See also Burke-White, supra 
note 59. 
 62  Burke-White, supra note 59. 
 63  Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39. 
 64  Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 438, ¶ 81 (July 
22) [hereinafter, Kosovo Advisory Opinion].  
 65  In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222 (Can.); H. Tagliavini, 
Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia: Report 17 (2009) [hereinafter, 
Tagliavini Report]. 
 66  See Borgen, supra note 12, at 8.   
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conflict is a threat to international peace and security; and (3) another 
sovereign state intervening in the conflict in support of the 
separatists.67  This implies that secession may be carried out in several 
ways.  One of the least controversial ways to effectuate secession is with 
the parent state’s consent.68  Additionally, secession may represent a 
UN-supported remedy for a situation that the Security Council deems 
to be a threat to international peace and security invoking Chapter VII 
authority (binding all member states to this determination).69  
 The most controversial way to secede is by unilateral remedial 
secession, which occurs when neither the parent state nor the UN 
consents to secession.  One scholar argues that remedial secession 
“arises in only the most extreme cases and, even then, under certain 
defined circumstances.”70  For example, a parent state committing 
genocide or crimes against humanity may trigger the right to 
secession.71  Essentially, for secession to rightfully occur, the 
circumstances on the ground have to be dire for the separatist 
population, and all other means of reconciling the conflict internally 
must have been exhausted.72  As discussed supra, territorial integrity of 
the states is a cornerstone component of the UN legal order.  
Therefore, the secessionist conflict must be extreme to warrant the 
dismemberment of a state against its will.  
D. R2P 
The concept of R2P is comprised of three pillars: (1) all states 
have the responsibility to protect civilians within its territory; (2) the 
entire international community bears the responsibility to ensure that 
 
 67  See id. at 9.  
 68  See generally Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second 
Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 178, 184 (1992). 
 69  For example, the Security Council deemed the conflict in Darfur a threat to 
international peace and security.  See S.C. Res. 1945, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1945 
(Oct. 14, 2010).  In connection with a 2005 peace agreement between the Government 
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, voters in a January 2011 
referendum overwhelmingly voted for independence, thereby creating the new state 
of South Sudan.  See Independence of South Sudan, UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE 
SUDAN, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/ 
referendum.shtml.  See also G.A. Res. 65/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/308 (Aug. 25, 
2011) (admitting the Republic of South Sudan as a UN member state). 
 70  Borgen, supra note 12, at 9 (citing In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
217, 282 (Can.)).   
 71  See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 3.  
 72  In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 285–86; Angelika Nußberger, South 
Ossetia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e2068?rskey=r4w7nk&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated Jan. 2013). 
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each state is complying with this obligation; and (3) in cases where a 
state fails to comply with such obligation, other states may use any 
necessary means to protect the civilians within that state’s territory.73  
R2P arose out of the shortcomings of humanitarian intervention 
because lawful humanitarian intervention typically requires Security 
Council authorization.74  Indeed, the ICJ in Nicaragua v. United States 
largely prohibited humanitarian concerns as a legal justification for 
unilateral military intervention in another state.75  R2P, on the other 
hand, places emphasis on the need for civilian protection.76 
The doctrine of R2P is a relatively new addition to the UN legal 
order.  Although not codified in the UN Charter, R2P has made its way 
into the UN legal order through Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions.77  R2P was originally adopted by the UN’s High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in preparation for the 
2005 World Summit.78  By the end of the 2005 World Summit, more 
than 170 states adopted the final report.79  The most notable 
applications of R2P are Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, 
 
 73  Lee, supra note 41, at 252.   
 74  See Nicar. v. U.S.,1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 134 (June 27) (“[W]hile the United States 
might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in 
Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure 
such respect . . . . The Court concludes that the argument derived from the 
preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the 
conduct of the United States . . . .”); G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103, 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal 
Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981).  Humanitarian intervention is commonly defined as 
“the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization 
primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from 
widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights.”  SEAN D. 
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 11–12 (1996).  The aforementioned 
shortcomings refer to the fact that the usage of humanitarian intervention focuses 
more upon the legality of intervention instead of focusing upon the need to protect 
civilians.  See Christian Walter, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: What It Says and What It Does 
Not Say, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 17 (2014).  
 75  See Nicar v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 134.  
 76  See id. 
 77  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005); 
S.C. Res. 2031, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2031 (Jan. 31, 2013); S.C. Res. 2016, ¶ 3, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2016 (Oct. 27, 2011); S.C. Res. 1973, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 
(Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1970, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); 
S.C. Res. 1923, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1923 (May 25, 2010); S.C. Res. 1861, preamble, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1861 (Jan. 14, 2009); S.C. Res. 1856, preamble, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1856 (Dec. 22, 2008); S.C. Res. 1778, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 (Sept. 
25, 2007); S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 15(a)(ii), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007); S.C. Res. 
1706, ¶ 12(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006). 
 78  See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).  
 79  See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 77. 
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regarding the conflict in Libya, passed under Chapter VII authority.80 
The general consensus is that R2P has not yet formed into 
customary international law due to lack of opinio juris and state 
practice.81  The UN Secretary-General’s 2012 report classified R2P as a 
“political framework based on fundamental principles of international 
law for preventing and responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”82  Therefore, R2P is not a 
binding obligation under international law.  At most, R2P can be seen 
as a norm of international law.83  Nevertheless, the Security Council 
invoked R2P in connection with multilateral intervention. 
The status of R2P under international law is controversial to say 
the least.  The conflict in Libya soured many states due to the high 
potential for R2P to be used as a pretext for regime change.  For 
example, Security Council Resolution 1973 limited the scope of 
military operations by excluding “a foreign occupation force” and, 
further, implying that intervention was meant to be defensive in 
nature—to protect civilians.84  Moreover, the Arab League’s 
endorsement of Resolution 1973 was a key reason why Russia and 
China did not use their veto powers.85  Russia and China immediately 
issued their condemnation when Western powers used Resolution 
1973 as a legal justification for offensive military operations and 
eventual regime change.86  The perceived pretextual usage of R2P will 
 
 80  S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 77; S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 77. 
 81  William Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 17, 34 (Jared Genser & Irvin Cotler eds., 2011).  Opinio juris 
and state practice are two essential elements for a rule to ripen into customary 
international law.  “State practice” refers to an objective level of consistent state 
behavior conforming to the rule.  See Assessment of Customary International Law, INT’L 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/ 
v1_rul_in_asofcuin#Fn_80_10 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).  Opinio juris is a subjective 
inquiry assessing whether the state behavior arose from a belief that the state was 
legally obligated to take such action.  See id.  
 82  U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep. 
of the Secretary-General, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).   
 83 Lee, supra note 41, at 277 (“What the Responsibility to Protect is not, however, 
is an international legal rule.  It has not been codified in an international treaty; it lacks 
the state practice and sufficient opinio juris to give rise to customary international law; 
and it does not qualify as a general princip[le] of law.  Instead, the Responsibility to 
Protect is best understood as a norm of international conduct.”) (quoting Burke-
White, supra note 81, at 34).   
 84  S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 77, ¶ 4; Lee, supra note 41, at 295.   
 85  Michael Fullilove, China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum, 34 
WASH. Q. 63, 71 (2011); Lee, supra note 41, at 296. 
 86  See Lee, supra note 41, at 301; see also Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto 
Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan, U.N. Press Release SC/10536 
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most likely stifle the application of forcible R2P in the near future.87 
III. RUSSIA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
As a P5 Member, Russia wields significant influence within the 
Security Council.  Many scholars argue that Russia’s prominent status 
within the UN is one reason why Russia holds the UN legal order in 
high regard.88  Due to Russia’s P5 status, it is important to understand 
Russia’s voting position in order to understand the potential, or lack 
thereof, for Security Council action in the future.  As discussed supra, 
the Security Council is the body within the UN legal order tasked with 
maintaining international peace and stability.89  Through the passage 
of resolutions, the Security Council determines when intervention is 
warranted in other states’ domestic affairs.  Thus, its decisions reflect 
the law of intervention as agreed upon by the voting member states.  A 
member state’s vote and subsequent legal explanation becomes highly 
relevant in determining not only that state’s view on the law, but also 
the UN legal order’s content and scope. 
As a preliminary matter, when a P5 Member abstains from a vote, 
it “withholds from the proposed action the legitimacy that an 
affirmative vote from it provides.”90  Thus, a Russian abstention 
allowing the Security Council action to proceed should not be 
misconstrued as Russian support.91  As with every member state, the 
voting decision is context dependent and fact specific.  This is 
emphasized in Russia’s justification for abstaining on Resolution 1284, 
regarding weapons monitoring in Iraq.92  Specifically, the Russian 
representative noted that “the fact that his country did not block this 
imperfect resolution did not mean that it was obliged to go along with 
a forceful implementation of it.”93  Therefore, abstentions and vetoes 
are similarly considered as negative votes.  Voting patterns within the 
Security Council and the associated legal justifications set forth by 
member states indicate, in part, state views on intervention in the 
 
(Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10536.doc.htm. 
 87  See Lee, supra note 41, at 302.   
 88  See Andrew Monaghan, Calmly Critical: Evolving Russian Views of US Hegemony, 29 
J. STRATEGIC STUD. 987–1013 (2006).  
 89  See U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 90  PHIL C. W. CHAN, A Keen Observer of the International Rule of Law?, in CHINA, STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 238, 259 (2015). 
 91  See id.   
 92  S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999).  
 93  Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Establishes New Monitoring 
Commission for Iraq Adopting Resolution 1284 (1999) By Vote Of 11-0-4, U.N. Press 
Release SC/6775 (Dec. 17, 1999).  
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context of the UN legal order.  Identifying a state’s legal stance on 
intervention will juxtapose how it behaves as a member state within the 
UN legal order and its unilateral conduct outside of the UN. 
Analyzing Russia’s voting behavior and legal justifications for its 
votes is necessary to determine the parameters for Russian 
intervention.  An understanding of the circumstances required for 
Russia to support collective Security Council action will provide a full 
picture of Russia’s decision to unilaterally intervene in Georgia and 
Ukraine.  Part VI will show that Russia’s legal position on intervention 
in the Security Council stands in seeming contradiction with its legal 
arguments for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. 
This section of the Comment will use the recent intrastate 
conflicts in Libya and Syria as measures for Russia’s voting pattern and 
legal attitude regarding international intervention.  It is important to 
note, however, that Russia’s decision to support or oppose any given 
Security Council resolution does not take place in a vacuum.  Russia’s 
voting behavior reflects some combination of Russia’s self-interest, the 
unique characteristics of the conflict, and Russia’s legal perspective on 
the UN legal order.  With regard to Libya and Syria, Part A will discuss 
Russia’s action, or inaction, as a P5 Member in the Security Council.  
Then, Part B will draw common trends in Russia’s voting pattern and 
associated legal reasoning. 
A. Russia’s Evolving Voting Pattern Emerging from the Violent 
Intrastate Conflicts in Libya and Syria 
As stated supra, the large-scale interstate violence of two world 
wars led to the creation of the UN and the Security Council.  In the 
past few decades, however, the growing rate of intrastate conflicts has 
forced the UN—and in particular, the Security Council—to adapt to 
this new reality and make more decisions regarding intervention in 
internal conflicts with human rights abuses.94  Libya and Syria 
represent two prime test cases to analyze the legal position on 
intervention adopted by Russia in the Security Council.  The violent 
intrastate conflicts in Libya and Syria originated from political 
instability and oppressive government regimes that systemically 
committed human rights violations.  Russia’s decision to support or 
oppose resolutions regarding these conflicts exemplifies its overall 
view on intervention and what parameters must be met to justify 
 
 94  C.f. Katie Lynch, China and the Security Council: Congruence of the Voting Between 
Permanent Members, 5 CHINA PAPERS 2009, at 26–27 (2009) (arguing that China and 
Russia cooperate more often than any other states in the Security Council). 
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violating territorial integrity.95  Sub-part 1 will analyze Russia’s conduct 
regarding Libya, and Sub-part 2 will discuss how Russia reacted to the 
civil war in Syria. 
1. Libya 
Spurred by the Arab Spring, widespread political protest against 
Colonel Qaddafi’s oppressive regime began in February 2011.96  In 
response to the growing unrest, the Qaddafi regime used military force 
to quell protesters.97  The Arab League swiftly condemned this violence 
against Libyan civilians;98 as a result, the Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1970, imposing against the Libyan government a 
sanctions regime consisting of an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an 
assets freeze.99  As the situation worsened, the Arab League endorsed 
the imposition of a no-fly zone to prevent the Libyan government from 
using military aircrafts against civilians.100  Taking up the call, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which invoked Chapter VII 
authority in imposing the no-fly zone and authorized member states to 
“take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under the threat of attack.”101  Despite supporting 
Resolution 1970, Russia and China abstained from voting for 
Resolution 1973.102 
Air strikes led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France began in March 2011 to dismantle the Qaddafi regime.103  
Shortly thereafter, the NATO took over military operations to enforce 
Resolution 1973.104  The NATO-led military intervention ended in 




 95  See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.  
 96  See Chronology of Events: Libya, SECURITY COUNCIL REP., 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/libya.php?page=9 (last updated 
Nov. 30, 2015). 
 97  See id. 
 98  Id.  
 99  See S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 77.  
 100  Arab League Backs Libya No-Fly Zone, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12723554. 
 101  S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 77, at ¶ 4.  
 102  See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ 
over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in 
Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).  
 103  See Chronology of Events: Libya, supra note 96. 
 104  Id. 
 105  See id.  
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Russia’s affirmative support for Resolution 1970 turned into non-
support when Russia abstained from voting for Resolution 1973.  
During the time preceding Resolution 1973, the international 
community became more divided, especially with the African Union 
explicitly opposing any NATO intervention.106  Russia’s Permanent 
Representative to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, elaborated upon Russia’s 
legal reasoning for abstention.  Mr. Churkin noted that the resolution 
“could potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention.”107  
Instead of involving military force, Russia advocated an immediate 
ceasefire to secure the civilian population.108  Shortly after the NATO 
intervention began, leaders of Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, and 
India expressed severe criticism towards the offensive military 
intervention, arguing that Resolution 1973 was “being interpreted 
arbitrarily.”109  Russia’s pre-passage objections to Resolution 1973 
seemed to come true; Russia argued that NATO acted outside of the 
scope of Resolution 1973 by engaging in offensive military aircraft 
action that effectively ousted the Qaddafi regime.110 
2. Syria 
The first major protests sparking the current civil war in Syria 
began in Damascus in March 2011.111  The Assad regime used military 
force against civilian protesters in May 2011.  Only several months 
later, the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership due to the 
violence committed against the civilian population.112  In October 
2013, the Assad regime engaged in the “Starvation Until Submission 
Campaign,” and later that year, UN inspectors found clear evidence 
that sarin gas was used against civilians.113  The chaos in Syria multiplied 
with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).114  As of 
 
 106  See Enrico Carisch & Loraine Rickard-Martin, Global Threats and the Role of United 
Nations Sanctions, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG INT’L POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2011). 
 107  U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17, 2011).  
 108  See id.  
 109  Chronology of Events: Libya, supra note 96.  
 110  Lee, supra note 41, at 301.  
 111  See Anup Kaphle, Timeline: Unrest in Syria, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2014), 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/timeline-unrest-in-syria/207/. 
 112  See Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/ 
arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0. 
 113  Rep. of U.N. Human Rights Council, Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic, 25th Sess., July 15, 2013–Jan. 20, 2014, ¶¶ 13, 127–29, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014). 
 114  See Ben Hubbard, ISIS Tightens Its Grip with Seizure of Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES 
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February 2015, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated the 
death toll to be approximately 210,000 after almost four years of civil 
war.115 
In light of the dire circumstances on the ground, the Security 
Council action thus far has been meek, partly because of Russia.  
Resolution 2043 created the United Nations Supervision Mission in 
Syria (UNSMIS), composed of 300 unarmed military observers.116  
Moreover, Resolution 2118 ordered the Assad regime to destroy all 
chemical weapons within its possession.117  In response to the 
“Starvation Until Submission Campaign,” Resolution 2139 demanded 
all parties to allow civilians to move freely throughout the country and 
called for the delivery of humanitarian aid.118  By unanimous vote and 
without Syria’s consent, the Security Council passed Resolution 2165, 
which authorized UN access to the Syria-Iraq border for humanitarian 
aid delivery.119 
The resolutions passed in response to the Syrian conflict are only 
part of the story.  Russia, along with China, vetoed a total of four 
resolutions regarding Syria.120  In October 2011, Russia and China 
jointly vetoed a draft resolution that attributed the atrocities to the 
Assad regime and commanded the regime to cease all hostilities.121  
Russia vetoed the resolution because it did not “agree with this 
unilateral, accusatory bent against Damascus.”122  Mr. Churkin 
explained that Russia introduced an alternative draft resolution 
instead focusing on Syria’s territorial integrity and the principle of 
non-intervention.123  In justifying Russia’s veto for another draft 
resolution in 2012, Mr. Churkin noted that some member states “have 
undermined any possibility of a political settlement, calling for regime 
 
(Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/world/middleeast/ 
isis-militants-capture-air-base-from-syrian-government-forces.html. 
 115  Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Syria Death Toll Now Exceeds 210,000: Rights Group, REUTERS 
(Feb. 7, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-mideast-
crisis-toll-idUSKBN0LB0DY20150207.   
 116  S.C. Res. 2043, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012).  
 117  See S.C. Res. 2118, ¶¶ 2–4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
 118  See S.C. Res. 2139, ¶¶ 5–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2139 (Feb. 22, 2014). 
 119  See S.C. Res. 2165, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2165 (July 14, 2014). 
 120  See Security Council—Veto List, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY RESEARCH GUIDES, 
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (last updated Apr. 13, 2015).  
 121  S.C., France, Germany, Portugal, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution, ¶¶ 1, 4, U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011).  
 122  U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011).  
 123  Id.; see also S.C., Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United 
States of America: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012).  
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change, encouraging the opposition towards power, indulging in 
provocation and nurturing the armed struggle.”124  Later that same 
year, Russia vetoed yet another draft resolution indicating that Western 
states would “use the Security Council of the United Nations to further 
their plans of imposing their own designs on sovereign States.”125  
Specifically, Russia refused to support the draft resolution that would 
only impose sanctions upon the Assad regime, but did not take foreign 
military intervention off of the table.126 
Finally, Russia vetoed a May 2014 draft resolution that sought to 
refer the conflict to the International Criminal Court (ICC).127  Mr. 
Churkin reiterated Russia’s beliefs that only locally-based solutions 
would end the conflict and that the draft resolution “reveals an attempt 
to use the ICC to further inflame political passions and lay the ultimate 
groundwork for eventual outside military intervention.”128  It is also 
worth noting that Russia has several self-interested reasons for refusing 
to permit intervention in Syria.  First, Russia maintains a naval base in 
Syria, which is its “last foreign military base outside the former Soviet 
Union.”129  Additionally, Syria buys significant amounts of military 
exports from Russia, thereby providing the country with much needed 
revenue.130 
 
 124  U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6711th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6711 (Feb. 4, 2012).  
 125  U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6810th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810 (July 19, 2012); 
see also S.C., France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. 
S/2012/538 (July 19, 2012). 
 126  See U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6810th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810 (July 19, 
2012). 
 127  S.C., Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Demark, Estonia, England, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, 
Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft 
Resolution, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014). 
 128  U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7180th mtg. at 12–13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7180 (May 22, 
2014). 
 129  Max Fisher, The Four Reasons Why Russia Won’t Give up Syria, No Matter What 
Obama Does, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/worldviews/wp/2013/09/05/the-four-reasons-russia-wont-give-up-syria-no-
matter-what-obama-does/.  
 130  Id.; see also Ben Piven, Russia Expands Military Footprint Abroad with New Syria Base, 
ALJAZEERA AM. (Sept. 18, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/ 
articles/2015/9/18/russia-foreign-military-bases.html.  
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B. Russia’s Legal Stance on Intervention as a P5 Member 
The term “intervention” in the Russian language refers only to the 
use of armed force.131  Other forms of intervention, such as economic 
aid or political support, are referred to as “non-interference.”132  
Therefore, the mere use of the term “intervention” implies a more 
aggressive behavior when interpreted by Russians than it otherwise 
would when interpreted by people of other ethnicities and cultures.133 
Historically, Russia maintained a negative perspective on 
humanitarian intervention.  Between 1918 and 1922, the Russian 
homeland suffered attacks from fourteen different states.134 Russians 
characterized World War I as the war against Nazi interventionists.135  
In the Soviet context, the term “intervention” was associated with acts 
that violated international law by undermining state sovereignty.136  
Due to being a victim of intervention, Russia developed a stricter 
notion of state sovereignty rendering any claim for intervention 
suspect.137 
The fact that Russia itself is experiencing separatist movements 
within its borders also speaks towards Russia’s apprehension of 
humanitarian intervention.  Russia may fear foreign states intervening 
in its own domestic affairs and limiting its ability to quash separatist 
movements.138  For example, Chechnya is one of the bloodiest 
secessionist movements within Russia.  In Isayeva v. Russia and Isayeva 
v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights held that Russia 
breached the European Convention on Human Rights due to its 
indiscriminate use of heavy military weaponry against civilians in 
Chechnya.139  Therefore, Russia has an interest in objecting to 
humanitarian intervention on behalf of separatist movements.
 Russia’s P5 status within the Security Council provides it with great 
authority to decide whether the UN should authorize foreign 
 
 131  See Baranovsky, supra note 4, at 14.  
 132  See id. 
 133  Indeed, the common understanding of “intervention” has changed over time 
by becoming highly associated with military intervention.  See KOFI ATTA ANNAN, THE 
QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 3, 9 (United 
Nations Dep’t of Pub. Info. 1999).  
 134  See Baranovksy, supra note 4, at 12.  
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 13.  
 137  See id. at 13–14. 
 138  See Lynch, supra note 94. 
 139  Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 191 (2005), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68381; Isayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 
57948/00, 57949/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 195 (2005), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68379. 
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intervention.  As discussed supra, Russia often makes an effort to justify 
its actions under international law.140  Thus, analyzing the ways in which 
Russia legally justifies its voting behavior is crucial in gaining the full 
picture of Russia’s legal perspective on both foreign intervention and 
the UN legal order.  Russia’s voting pattern and associated legal 
reasoning in the recent intrastate conflicts in Libya and Syria serve as 
measurement for Russia’s overall legal stance.141 
Russia’s overarching legal position on humanitarian intervention 
is founded upon its great deference for state sovereignty,142 the 
principle of nonintervention, and territorial integrity.143  Russia fosters 
close ties with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group of states 
that represents developing countries within the UN and objects to 
foreign intervention without host state consent.144  Moreover, Russia 
seems to value diplomacy over military force in ending violent 
conflict.145  Indeed, for many conflicts, Russia believes that intervention 
will only create further unrest.146  As an over-arching principle and 
pursuant to the UN Charter, Russia believes that the Security Council 
is the only body with the authority to sanction foreign intervention.147  
 
 140  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 141  It is important to note, however, that Russia does not adhere to one legal policy 
per se because every conflict is different.  This Section merely aims to identify Russia’s 
general legal stance for foreign intervention.   
 142  In light of Russia experiencing its own separatist movements, like in Chechyna, 
it makes sense why Russia highly values state sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention.  In a strict sense, state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention 
both preclude intervention in the domestic affairs of states without their consent.  
Therefore, Russia would not need to worry about outside intervention in its own quest 
to quell internal unrest.  See Saira Mohamed, Shame in the Security Council, 90 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1191, 1246 (2013); see also Baranovsky, supra note 4, at 25–26.  
 143  See Mohamed, supra note 142; DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF 
THE UNION, supra note 16, at 15.  For example, Russia argued that the only way the 
Security Council could establish an observer force in the Palestinian territories was 
with the consent of Israel and Palestine.  See Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Observer Mission for Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, U.N. Press Release SC/6976 (Dec. 18, 2000). 
 144  See Mohamed, supra note 141, at 1247; The Non-Aligned Movement: Description and 
History, NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, http://www.nam.gov.za/background/ 
history.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2001).  
 145  See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, supra note 16, 
at 15.  This is part of the reason why Russia does not generally view intrastate conflicts 
as posing a threat to international peace and security, thereby not warranting Security 
Council action. 
 146  See Baranovsky, supra note 4, at 19.  
 147  See id. at 20; Gilbert Rozman, Russian Repositioning in Northeast Asia: Putin’s Impact 
and Current Prospects, in RUSSIA’S PROSPECTS IN ASIA 63, 69 (Stephen J. Blank ed., 2010) 
(“The two also share a firm commitment to leave with the UN Security Council the 
sole authority to address questions or the use of force beyond one’s national 
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Often, Russia will forego the state consent requirement when a 
regional organization endorses intervention.148 
In applying these generalized legal positions to Libya, Russia’s 
change of heart in the Security Council is telling.  In its positive vote 
for Resolution 1970, Russia (along with China) “did not see any reason 
not to go with what the Arab League wanted,”149 showing that Russia 
does value regional organization support when making its decision to 
support a resolution.  The tides began to turn when Russia grew 
suspicious that Western states would militarily intervene in Libya and 
voiced its objections that Resolution 1973 was worded too broadly.150  
Staying true to its preference for diplomatic solutions over military 
intervention against host state consent, Russia instead proposed that 
the Security Council should call for a ceasefire in Libya.151 
The aftermath of NATO intervention in Libya greatly influenced 
Russia’s legal position in the Security Council on intervention.  As 
discussed supra, Russia voiced its criticism about the regime change 
effectuated by Resolution 1973 and the subsequent NATO 
intervention.152  Inherently, the air-based NATO military campaign 
against the Qaddafi regime represented a severe intrusion on Libya’s 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are two legal principles 
that Russia highly values.  In fact, Mr. Churkin stated that Russia was: 
[C]oncerned at the trend towards an arbitrary interpretation 
of the norms of international humanitarian law for the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict and their application 
to the responsibility to protect.  It is unacceptable to use 
issues related to the protection of civilians and overall human 
rights to achieve political goals, especially as a pretext for 
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States.153 
Therefore, Russia seems much more cautious about invoking R2P in 
any Security Council action due to the Libyan regime change.154  It is 
notable, however, that despite Russia’s criticism of R2P, Russia does 
recognize that a state has a legal duty to protect civilians.155  Russia 
 
borders.”). 
 148  See Mohamed, supra note 142, at 1247.   
 149  Lee, supra note 41, at 298. 
 150  See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17, 
2011).  
 151  See id. 
 152  See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.  
 153  U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 6903rd mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6903 (Jan. 21, 2013). 
 154  See, e.g., David Rieff, Opinion, R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all.   
 155  See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council, Expressing Deep Regret 
over Toll on Civilians in Armed Conflict, Reaffirms Readiness to Respond to Their 
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differs from other states because it believes that the international 
community should primarily assist states in maintaining this duty.156 
The aftermath of Libya has, in part, influenced Russia’s legal 
justifications in vetoing four draft resolutions on the Syrian civil war.  
The violence in Syria is much greater than the rebellion in Libya, yet 
Russia (and China as well) refuses to support similar Security Council 
action.157  As indicated in Russia’s legal justifications for its negative 
votes, Russia was very concerned with adhering to Syria’s territorial 
integrity and the principle of non-intervention.158  Moreover, Russia 
made it clear that it would not allow other member states to use 
Security Council authorization to effect regime change and, therefore, 
adopted a conservative approach in choosing the language to be 
included in any successful resolution.159 
Overall, Russia adheres to more conservative legal rules in the 
Security Council by requiring certain parameters before offering its 
support for foreign intervention.  These requirements for intervention 
of course are not only products of Russia’s legal view on intervention, 
but also are influenced by other political factors.  Although Russia’s 
perspective may raise controversy and seem like an outlier compared 
to other member states, Russia does not ignore the principles 
underlying the UN legal order.  Indeed, Russia grounds its legal 
position using foundational elements of the UN legal order such as 











Deliberate Targeting, U.N. Press Release SC/9786 (Nov. 11, 2009) (discussing how 
Mr. Churkin stated that the “protection of civilians was primarily the responsibilities 
of States involved in conflict, and the actions of the international community should 
be aimed at assisting national efforts”).  
 156  See id.  
 157  DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, supra note 16, at 
6.   
 158  See supra note 123 and accompanying text.   
 159  See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.  
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IV. THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SECESSION IN KOSOVO 
AND HOW IT INFLUENCED RUSSIA’S LEGAL RHETORIC 
Kosovo’s independence160 from Serbia heavily influenced Russia’s 
legal justifications for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine.  Sub-part 
A will briefly introduce the conflict’s factual background. Sub-part B 
discusses Russia’s opposition to NATO intervention.  Sub-part C 
discusses the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo and the legal 
arguments set forth by Russia.  Finally, Sub-part D analyzes how the 
situation in Kosovo affected Russia’s legal stance towards the UN legal 
order. 
A. The Kosovo Conflict 
Most of Kosovar’s population is ethnic Albanian with a Serb 
minority.161  Kosovo enjoyed autonomy under the Federal Socialist 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FSRY) as a province of the Serbian republic.162  
Under the FRSY’s legal framework, only republics were entitled to 
statehood after its dissolution.163  Along with the crumbling Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (“Soviet Union”), the FRSY began to 
disintegrate in 1991 with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia 
declaring independence from Yugoslavia.164  Serbia and Montenegro, 
however, continued the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).165  
Subsequently, Kosovo first declared independence from Yugoslavia on 
September 21, 1991, which had little success as only Albania 
recognized Kosovo’s independence.166 
 
 160  Kosovo’s status as an independent state remains hotly contested to this day.  See, 
e.g., Jure Vidmar, Kosovo: Unilateral Secession and Multilateral State-Making, in KOSOVO: A 
PRECEDENT? THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 143, 177 
(James Summers ed., 2011) (arguing that Kosovo fails to satisfy statehood 
requirements).  In fact, only ninety-six states recognize Kosovo as an independent 
state.  Countries that Have Recognized the Republic of Kosovo, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., 
http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
 161  Demographic Changes of the Kosovo Population 19482006, STATISTICAL OFFICE OF 
KOSOVO (Feb. 2008), https://ask.rks-gov.net/ENG/pop/publications/doc_details/ 
521-demographic-changes-of-the-kosovo-population-1948-
2006?tmpl=component&format=raw.  
 162  James Summers, Kosovo, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 236 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2014). 
 163  Id. at 237–38.  
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id.  See also European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the 
Guidelines of the Recognition of New States, Dec. 16, 1991, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1485, 
1485–86 (1992) (explaining how the European Community recognized the 
independence of only former Yugoslav republics). 
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Serbia began a “Serbianization” campaign in Kosovo to solidify 
authority over the region,167 and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
commenced guerilla insurgency against Serbia.168  In response, Serbia 
commenced military operations in Kosovo, resulting in widespread 
atrocities against ethnic Albanians.169  The Serbs committed ethnic 
cleansing against ethnic Albanians and displaced about 200,000 
Kosovars in the process.170 
After negotiations to end the violence failed, and amidst 
continued ethnic cleansing, NATO began an airstrike campaign 
against the FRY.171  While NATO did not have Security Council 
authorization to intervene,172 it justified the use of force as “necessary 
to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.”173  Shortly thereafter, the armed 
conflict concluded with a peace agreement.174 
The Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which created a 
framework for the international administration of Kosovo.175  The 
Security Council established a peacekeeping mission, the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to create a stable political 
framework.176  This interim regime177 permitted Kosovo to exercise self-
government within the territorial integrity of the FRY, while 
simultaneously prohibiting the FRY from exercising sovereignty over 
the region.178  Moreover, Resolution 1244 established a process to 
determine the final status of Kosovo, but did not include many details 
on how this would occur.179  The UN administration lasted for several 
years, but officials announced in December 2007 that the negotiation 




 167  See Kokott, supra note 55, at 15–26. 
 168  Summers, supra note 162, at 238.  
 169  Borgen, supra note 12, at 3.  
 170  See ALEX J. BELLAMY, KOSOVO AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 120–55 (2002); TIM 
JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE 140–71 (1st ed. 2000). 
 171  Waters, supra note 60, at 216. 
 172  This was due to Russia’s and China’s veto power and political opposition to such 
intervention. 
 173  See Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org. (NATO), Press Statement by Dr. Javier 
Solana, Secretary General of NATO (Mar. 23, 1999).  
 174  Summers, supra note 162, at 240.  
 175  See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
 176  See id. ¶ 9. 
 177  Id. ¶ 10. 
 178  Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, pmbl. 
 179  See id. ¶ 11. 
 180  Borgen, supra note 12, at 4.  
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Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence on February 17, 
2008 and claimed that it had reached statehood.181  A minority of states 
recognized Kosovo as a state shortly thereafter.182  Upon Serbia’s 
request in 2008, the UN General Assembly asked the ICJ to provide an 
Advisory Opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s independence (“Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion”).183  The ICJ delivered its ten-to-four majority 
opinion on July 22, 2010 and announced that Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence did not violate international law.184  The ICJ’s decision, 
however, is silent as to any potential right to secede under 
international law.185 
B. Russia’s Reaction to NATO Intervention in Kosovo 
As discussed supra, Russia exhibits caution towards intervention 
and, more often than not, shows great deference to the principle of 
non-intervention.186  The legal parameters187 for Russia to support 
intervention in the Security Council were all at play in the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo.  Russia saw Yugoslavia (Serbia’s predecessor) 
“as the victim of aggression from powerful nations, the object of unfair 
treatment on the part of those who are stronger and more numerous 
and can impose their will on one who is weaker.”188  The effectiveness 
of humanitarian intervention was also brought into question because 
approximately 350,000 Serbs fled Kosovo immediately following the 
arrival of NATO-led forces amidst increasing reports of violence 
against Serbs.189  This example illustrates why Russia often argues that 
foreign intervention may worsen an intrastate conflict instead of 
 
 181  See Kosovo Declaration of Independence, Feb. 17, 2008, reprinted in 47 I.L.M. 
467, 471 (2008). 
 182  Summers, supra note 162, at 244.   
 183  G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
 184  Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J.403, ¶ 84 (July 22). 
 185  See id. ¶ 56.  Many scholars criticized the Court for not reaching the substantive 
issue of whether a right to secede exists under international law.  See, e.g., Anne Peters, 
Has the Advisory Opinion’s Finding that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was not Contrary 
to International Law Set An Unfortunate Precedent?, in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE 
KOSOVO ADVISORY OPINION 291, 299 (Marko Milanovi’c & Michael Wood eds., 2015); 
Timothy William Waters, Misplaced Boldness: The Avoidance of Substance in the 
International Court of Justice’s Kosovo Opinion, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 267, 267 
(2013). 
 186  See supra Part III. 
 187  See supra notes 142–48 and accompanying text.  
 188  Baranovsky, supra note 4, at 22 (citing S. Startsev, “Balkanskiy pristup 
geopolitichesogo darvinizma,” Osobaya papka NG (special appendix to Nezavisimaya 
gazeta), no. 1, Apr. 1999, 12). 
 189  Id. at 24 (citing Kosovo-eto, napomnim, chast Yugoslavii, Trud, 1 Apr. 2000 p. 
4). 
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curtailing the violence.190 
In addition, Russia is sensitive to NATO expansion.  States are 
often more concerned with perceived threats close to home rather 
than events happening farther abroad.191  Accordingly, NATO 
enlargement to states near Russian borders becomes a direct security 
threat to Russian territory.  Russia has clearly opposed NATO 
enlargement and refuses to allow neighboring states to turn into 
Western hubs.192  Following the 1995 NATO air-campaign against 
Bosnian Serbs, “Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, ‘[t]his is the first 
sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian 
Federation’s border . . . . The flame of war could burst out across the 
whole of Europe.’”193  In light of Russia’s sensitivity to NATO 
expansion, many Russians believe that purported human rights 
considerations used to justify intervention are a mere pretext for larger 
political goals.194 
C. The Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
Russia vehemently opposed Kosovar independence.  Russia’s legal 
arguments are comprehensively reflected in its written submission to 
the ICJ filed in connection with the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.195  These 
arguments are largely based upon state sovereignty, the norm of non-
intervention, and high respect for territorial integrity.196  Ultimately, 
Russia rejected any Kosovar claim for remedial secession from Serbia.197 
Before delving into its legal arguments, it is key to note that Russia 
made several factual observations about the Kosovo conflict.  Overall, 
Russia did not see the Kosovo conflict as an ongoing one.  Since 
Yugoslavia dissolved in 1992,198 the dissolution was irrelevant to the 
Kosovar claim for independence.199  Russia also separated the 
19981999 crises, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of thousands 
of Kosovar Albanians, from the period after Resolution 1244 where 
 
 190  See supra note 146 and accompanying text.  
 191  See Mearsheimer, supra note 7, at 81–82. 
 192  Id. at 77. 
 193  Id. at 78 (citation omitted). 
 194  See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also Antonov, supra note 2, at 22.  
 195  See Written Statement by the Russian Federation, Accordance with International 
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (Apr. 16, 2009). 
 196  Id. ¶ 21.  
 197  Id. ¶ 103. 
 198  See generally Danilo Türk, Recognition of States: A Comment, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 66 
(1993).  
 199  See Written Statement by the Russian Federation, supra note 195, ¶¶ 44–45. 
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Kosovars were “not being exposed to risks of discrimination.”200  
Therefore, Russia argued that the ICJ should only consider the 
February 2008 conditions in Kosovo for any possible claim of secession 
from Serbia, and that any atrocities committed between 1998 and 1999 
were no longer relevant to the inquiry.201  The reasoning behind this 
legal argument was that Kosovo had been under international 
administration for several years and Serbia no longer posed any threat 
to Kosovars.202 
As a preliminary matter, Russia asserted that the ICJ should use 
Security Council Resolution 1244 as the “special legal regime upon 
which the Court can base its consideration of the request.”203  Russia 
found the language affirming Serbia’s territorial integrity within 
Resolution 1244 particularly valuable in determining whether Kosovo 
had the right to secede.204  Additionally, Resolution 1244 never 
recognized secession as a possible outcome.205  Thus, Resolution 1244 
created a strong presumption in favor of maintaining Serbia’s 
territorial integrity.206 
Russia also attacked Kosovo’s February 2008 Declaration of 
Independence.  Russia classified territorial integrity as “an unalienable 
attribute of a State’s sovereignty.”207  Russia recognized, however, that 
a state’s territorial integrity may be overridden if it refuses to respect 
the self-determination of its “peoples.”208  Russia qualified this 
concession as only applying to extreme conditions where the existence 
of a “people” is at risk.209 
Russia also curiously noted that self-determination had not been 
invoked as a legal justification for intervention in Kosovo until years 
after the 1999 air-strike campaign.  Therefore, self-determination 
should not have been a legal basis for secession in 2008.210  Russia 
further argued that the 1999 NATO intervention was not based upon 
the Kosovar’s right to self-determination, but instead was taken for 
 
 200  Id. ¶ 46.  
 201  Id. ¶ 47.  
 202  Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 
 203  Id. ¶ 28.  
 204  Id. ¶ 54.  
 205  Written Statement by the Russian Federation, supra note 195, ¶ 56. 
 206  Id. ¶ 58.  
 207  Id. ¶ 77. 
 208  Id. ¶ 88.  This is based upon the Savings Clause in the Friendly Relations 
Declaration that has been construed to permit secession under certain conditions.  See 
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39. 
 209  Id. ¶ 87. 
 210  Id. ¶¶ 92, 94. 
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humanitarian purposes.211  Since Resolution 1244 addressed human 
rights abuses, this foreclosed any right to remedial secession.212  Finally, 
Russia noted how different the new Serbian state was from its 
predecessor, the FRY.213  Serbia adopted democracy and human rights 
law.214  Therefore, the Kosovars no longer faced any threat of force or 
severe oppression, foreclosing any right to secession.215 
D. The Kosovo Advisory Opinion’s Impact on Legal Rhetoric 
Similar to domestic law, ICJ cases often serve as precedent for 
future disputes, despite Article 59 of the Statute of the Court, which 
states that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”216  As 
opposed to traditional judgments between parties, the ICJ may also 
give advisory opinions on specific legal questions.217  An advisory 
opinion is technically not binding upon any party, but in reality carries 
heavy legal weight.218  International organizations are the only parties 
that enjoy the right to seek advisory opinions from the ICJ.219 
Despite considering Kosovo’s declaration of independence in an 
advisory capacity, some states have regarded the ICJ’s judgment as 
precedent.  Notwithstanding having NATO membership, however, 
Western powers, such as the United States, assert that Kosovo is sui 
generis and that no precedential value may be derived from the 
outcome.220  Western powers will likely continue to adopt such an 
approach for fear of emboldening separatist movements elsewhere.221  
Although it is one of Kosovo’s harshest critics, Russia has surprisingly 
embraced the ICJ’s advisory decision as precedent, invoking it to justify 
its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.222  In response to Western 
 
 211  Written Statement by the Russian Federation, supra note 195, at ¶ 94. 
 212  Id. ¶ 97. 
 213  See id. ¶ 99.  
 214  Id.  
 215  Id. ¶¶ 101, 103. 
 216  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, 3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat. 
1031, U.N.T.S. 993, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp. 215 (1945).  
 217  Id. art. 65. 
 218  Advisory Jurisdiction, I.C.J., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php? 
p1=5&p2=2 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
 219  Id. 
 220  See Borgen, supra note 12.  
 221  See id. 
 222  See, e.g., Angelika Nußberger, Abkhazia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. 
INT’L L. ¶ 30 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online) (last updated Jan. 2013) [hereinafter, 
Abkhazia Max Planck]; Burke-White, supra note 59, at 5; Waters, supra note 60; Russia 
Max Planck, supra note 7, at ¶ 150.  See infra Part V for a full discussion on Russia’s 
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recognition of Kosovo, former President Dmitry Medvedev stated: 
Western countries rushed to recognise Kosovo’s illegal 
declaration of independence from Serbia.  We argued 
consistently that it would be impossible, after that, to tell the 
Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups 
around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo 
Albanians was not good for them.  In international relations, 
you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for 
others.223 
In his March 18, 2014 speech to the Russian Duma,224 President Putin 
referenced the Kosovo Advisory Opinion in legally justifying Crimea’s 
declaration of independence.225  In effect, Russia flipped the tables 
against Western powers and used Kosovo as precedent to its own 
advantage. 
V. RUSSIA’S LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION IN 
GEORGIA AND UKRAINE 
Russia engaged in legal rhetoric to justify its actions to the 
international community for intervening in Georgia and Ukraine.  
Several potential reasons explain why Russia made such carefully 
crafted legal arguments.  Russia might have felt bound by international 
law and, therefore, set forth arguments believed to accurately reflect 
it.  Additionally, Russia may have been worried about reputational 
costs226 for disregarding international law completely and felt obligated 
to proffer legal justifications.  A “state with a poor reputation is either 
excluded from deals or it is charged a high price of admission.”227  
Regardless of the reasoning, it is necessary to identify Russia’s legal 
arguments for intervention to draw the dichotomy between Russia’s 
legal stance in the Security Council and how it behaves unilaterally. 
Russia’s legal justifications are more than just legalese.  The 
examination of statements made by states is imperative in assessing 
 
legal justifications for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. 
 223  Christopher Waters, South Ossetia, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 175, 179 (Christian Walters ed., 2014) [hereinafter, Christopher 
Waters South Ossetia] (quoting Dmitry Medvedev, Why I Had to Recognize Georgia’s 
Breakaway Regions, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/9c7ad792-7395-11dd-8a66-0000779fd18c.html#axzz1fDVC6nP8). 
 224  The Russian Duma is the lower house of the Russia’s national parliament, 
known as the Federal Assembly.   
 225  See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 5–6.  
 226  Reputational costs are consequences of state behavior that negatively influence 
state reputation.  
 227  Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 245 
(2009).  
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customary international law.228  Both opinio juris and state practice may 
be derived from state legal rhetoric.229  The ICJ frequently considers 
official statements as examples of state practice.230  Russia’s legal 
rhetoric can be construed as evidence opinio juris and state practice, 
thereby having potential to alter customary international law or, at the 
very least, create new international norms if accompanied with 
international acceptance.  Sub-part A discusses the Russian 
intervention in Georgia and Russia’s subsequent legal justifications for 
participating in the conflict.  Sub-part B similarly analyzes the more 
recent events in Ukraine.  Both of these sub-parts will also consider 
whether these legal arguments pass muster under the four UN legal 
order components discussed supra.  Finally, Sub-part C will describe 
commonalities, if any, between the legal arguments that Russia has 
proffered for each conflict. 
A. Russia’s Unilateral Intervention in Georgia 
1. Revisiting the Five Day Russo-Georgian War 
The origin of the war between Russia and Georgia lies in the 
Soviet Union’s perestroika period.  Georgia was a republic within the 
Soviet Union that enjoyed significant administrative powers and state 
apparatus.231  South Ossetia and Abkhazia232 were both semi-
autonomous regions within the republic.233  On September 20, 1990, 
South Ossetia asserted its sovereignty as a republic within the Soviet 
Union—Georgia subsequently withdrew South Ossetia’s limited 
autonomy, sparking full-scale armed conflict.234  In a similar fashion, 
Georgia annulled the Abkhaz declaration of state sovereignty in 1990, 
 
 228  In determining sources of international law, Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of 
the ICJ defines customary international law as “a general practice accepted as law.”  
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat. 1031, 
U.N.T.S. 993, 39 Am. J. Int’l L. Supp. 215 (1945). 
 229  Assessment of Customary International Law, supra note 81; see supra note 81 
(defining opinio juris and state practice).  
 230  See, e.g., Case concerning the Gab íkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39–46 (Sept. 25); Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 100 (June 27). 
 231  See South Ossetia Max Planck, supra note 72, at ¶ 6. 
 232  In 1931, Abkhazia was downgraded from its own republic within the Soviet 
Union to an autonomous region within the Georgian republic creating tension 
between Georgia and Abkhazia.  See Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 8.  
 233  Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 8; South Ossetia Max Planck, supra note 
72, at ¶ 5. 
 234  Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 176; South Ossetia Max Planck, 
supra note 72, at ¶ 10. 
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further flaring tensions.235  Georgia gained international recognition 
by the end of 1991 due to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia both declared independence from Georgia in 1992, 
but much of the world believed that the territories legally remained 
within the new Georgian state.236 
In the midst of these events, the armed conflict within Georgia 
intensified.  In regards to South Ossetia, the skirmishes lasted through 
1992, resulting in approximately 60,000 displaced Ossetians and 
Georgians.237  The armed conflict concluded with Georgia, Russia, and 
South Ossetia signing the Sochi Agreement in 1992.238  The ceasefire 
agreement deployed peacekeepers from each of the three signatories 
into South Ossetia, and negotiations commenced, sponsored by the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
regarding the future status of South Ossetia.239 
The events unfolded differently in Abkhazia.  Georgians and 
Abkhazians reportedly committed mass human rights violations 
during this time period.240  The conflict resulted in the mass eviction of 
Georgians from Abkhazia as a result of an effective ethnic cleansing 
campaign.241  Unlike the situation in South Ossetia, the UN was 
involved in Abkhazia.  A ceasefire brokered by Russia and the UN was 
signed in July 1993.242  Negotiations began to attempt to reconcile the 
differences between Georgia and Abkhazia under the auspices of the 
UN and the OSCE.243 
Throughout the 1990s, Russia began offering South Ossetians and 
Abkhazians Russian passports and citizenship.244  Additionally, South 
Ossetians and Abkhazians enjoyed free travel into Russia with the 
ability to earn Russian pensions and obtain other social benefits.245  The 
 
 235  Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 11. 
 236  Id. ¶ 12.  
 237  Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 176. 
 238  Id. 
 239  Id. at 177; Toomey, supra note 5, at 447. 
 240  Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 13. 
 241  Id. 
 242  Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 14; Farhad Mirzayev, Abkhazia, in SELF-
DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191, 193 (Christian Walters ed., 
2014).  
 243  See supra note 242. 
 244  See HUM. RTS. WATCH, UP IN FLAMES: HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS AND 
CIVILIAN VICTIMS IN THE CONFLICT OVER SOUTH OSSETIA 18 (Jan. 23, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/01/22/flames-0 (“[B]y the end of 2007, 
according to the South Ossetian authorities, some 97 percent of residents of South 
Ossetia had obtained Russian passports.”).  
 245  See id.  
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popularly deemed “Rose Revolution” occurred in 2003, ousting the 
Soviet-era leader Eduard Shevardnadze from the Georgian 
presidency.246  Mikheil Saakashvili’s ascent to power flared tensions in 
2004 when, under his direction, Georgia began an effort to reestablish 
control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.247  Former President Mikheil 
Saakashvili did not hesitate to warn that if peaceful efforts failed to re-
integrate both regions, Georgia would resort to physical force.248  
Despite such efforts, ninety-five percent of South Ossetians voted for 
separation from Georgia in a 2006 referendum.249 
During NATO’s April 2008 summit in Bucharest, officials 
considered extending membership to Georgia and Ukraine.250  The 
inclusion of these two states that directly border Russian territory 
raised serious concern within Russia.251  Russia’s deputy foreign 
minister at the time warned: “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in 
the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious 
consequences for pan-European security.”252 
Tensions came to a head in early August 2008.  The facts of how 
the war began are hotly contested; however, the standard account is 
that Georgia attacked the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, on 
August 7, 2008.253  In response, the Russian military mobilized on 
August 8, 2008, commencing a full-scale two-week military campaign 
against Georgia.254  Not only did Russian troops seek to repel the 
Georgian forces in Tskhinvali,255 but they also sought to attack 
 
 246  Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 177; see Giorgi Kandelaki, 
Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective, U.S. INST. PEACE, July 2006, at 10, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf (noting that to the dismay of 
Russia, Western powers and other Western non-governmental organizations 
supported the Rose Revolution). 
 247  Supra note 246; Waters, supra note 60, at 191. 
 248  Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 178.  
 249  Toomey, supra note 5, at 449. 
 250  See Press Release, NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration (Apr. 3, 2008), at ¶ 23, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.  
 251  See supra note 192 and accompanying text.  
 252  Mearsheimer, supra note 7, at 79. 
 253  See Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 1, 10; see also Christopher Waters South 
Ossetia, supra note 223, at 178.  On the contrary, Georgia contests this account for two 
reasons.  First, Georgia claims that it attacked Tskhinvali in response to numerous 
South Ossetian attacks upon Georgian villages.  See Borgen, supra note 12, at 5; Waters, 
supra note 60, at 207.  Second, Georgia maintains that Russian troops traveled from 
North Ossetia on August 7th and went through the Roki tunnel.  Therefore, the attack 
aimed to prevent Russian troops from entering South Ossetia from the Roki tunnel.  
See Toomey, supra note 5, at 450–51; Waters, supra note 60, at 207. 
 254  Borgen, supra note 12, at 5.  
 255  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 244, at 22–23; Toomey, supra note 5, at 451. 
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undisputed Georgian territory.256  In fact, Russian forces came within 
miles of the Georgian capital, Tbilsi.257 
Although the 2008 war was triggered by events in South Ossetia, 
conflict erupted in Abkhazia as well.  Russian and Abkhazian troops 
attacked Georgian forces stationed in the upper Kodori Valley, a 
region with no association to the Abkhazian plight.258  Abkhazian forces 
seized the territory after expelling the local Georgian population.259 
On August 12, 2008, French President Nikolas Sarkozy brokered 
the Six Point Ceasefire Agreement between the parties.260  Shortly 
thereafter, Russian troops withdrew from Georgia proper and 
returned to their South Ossetian bases.261  Russia formally recognized 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states on August 26, 2008.262  
As of this Comment, a total of four UN member states officially 
recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states: Russia, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru.263 
2. Russia’s Legal Arguments Justifying Intervention 
Russia’s military operations in Georgia effectively ousted the 
Georgian government from power in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a 
clear violation of the prohibition against the use of force and the norm 
of non-intervention.  Russia asserted three main legal arguments to 
justify its unilateral intervention in Georgia.  It is evident that Russia 
took care in crafting its legal position to facially comport with the UN 
legal order’s principles.  For example, Russia is well aware that there 
are only a few exceptions264 to the prohibition on the use of force and 
invoked those exceptions as legal justifications for its military 
 
 256  Borgen, supra note 12, at 15–16. 
 257  Id. at 5. 
 258  Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 18. 
 259  Id. 
 260  OFFICE OF THE STATE MINISTER OF GEORGIA FOR RECONCILIATION AND CIVIC 
EQUALITY, SIX POINT PEACE PLAN (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.smr.gov.ge/ 
docs/doc111.pdf. 
 261  Borgen, supra note 12, at 5.  
 262  Id. at 5–6.  
 263  Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 20; South Ossetia Max Planck, supra note 
72, at ¶ 1.  The island nation of Tuvalu withdrew its recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in 2014.  Tuvalu Profile–Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16340166.  Vanuatu withdrew 
recognition from Abkhazia in 2011.  See SB, Vanuatu Withdraws Recognition of Abkhazia, 
EURASIAN L. BREAKING NEWS (June 20, 2011), http://eurasian-law-breaking-
news.blogspot.com/2011_06_01_archive.html.  
 264  These exceptions include self-defense and humanitarian intervention.  See U.N. 
Charter arts. 42, 51; Green, supra note 31, at 229. 
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intervention in Georgia and Ukraine.  The real question, however, is 
whether Russia’s legal justifications actually comport with the UN legal 
order or whether they only conform on a surface level. 
The first sub-part of this Section will address the Russian 
“privileged interests” doctrine, from which two of Russia’s legal 
arguments derive.  Next, the second sub-part will explain Russia’s 
argument that it acted in self-defense for ethnic Russians in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.  The third sub-part discusses the humanitarian-
based concerns, which Russia asserted warranted intervention.  Finally, 
the fourth sub-part will address Russia’s final legal justification for 
intervention, predicated upon defending Russian peacekeepers within 
Georgia pursuant to the Sochi Agreement.265 
 i.The Privileged Interests Doctrine 
Before analyzing the first two justifications indicated supra, it is 
necessary to discuss the privileged interests doctrine.  Russia first 
coined the term “privileged interests” in 1968 when it advanced the 
Brezhnev doctrine to justify military aid to “fraternal count[ries]” 
dealing with civil strife.266  More recently, in 2008 the Russian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, explained that the doctrine means 
remembering “relationships with our old friends.”267  In essence, the 
privileged interests doctrine resembles the old “sphere of influence” 
rhetoric used during the Cold War.  Mr. Lavrov defined the doctrine 
to mean Russia “will develop friendly, mutually beneficial relations 
with all those who are prepared to do the same on the equal and 
mutually beneficial basis, paying particular attention to the traditional 
partners of the Russian Federation.”268  Mr. Lavrov further indicated 
that these “traditional partners” include the states of the former Soviet 
Union.269  During a speech on September 12, 2008 (only days after 
Russia withdrew from much of Georgia), then-President Medvedev 
asserted that Russia would foster close relations with states with which 
it has traditionally been close.270  Significantly, both Georgia and 
 
 265  See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text.  
 266  See Toomey, supra note 5.  
 267  Id. at 444 (quoting Transcript of Response to Questions by Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, During the Meeting with the Members of the Council 
on Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, New York 
(Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/world/sergey-lavrov/p34440 [hereinafter, 
Lavrov Transcript]). 
 268  Lavrov Transcript, supra note 267. 
 269  Id. 
 270  Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, Meeting with the 
Participants in the International Club Valdai (Sept. 12, 2008), 
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Ukraine were previously republics within the Soviet Union and, 
therefore, fit within the privileged interests doctrine. 
Article 61 of the Russian Constitution states: “[t]he Russian 
Federation shall guarantee to its citizens protection and patronage 
abroad.”271  Pursuant to this article and the privileged interests 
doctrine, Russia argues that it legally has the right to exercise some 
control over states that host Russian citizens.272  Significantly, Russia 
also believes that it may legally intervene on behalf of ethnic Russians 
in danger abroad under the auspices of humanitarian rescue.273  
Therefore, if an ethnic Russian finds himself or herself in imminent 
danger, Russia may unilaterally intervene to rescue the individual so 
long as the force used is proportionate.274 
As will be discussed in more detail infra, Russia specifically views 
the right of self-defense to include the protection of its nationals 
abroad.275  For example, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation, Valery Zorkin, interpreted Article 61 of the 
Russian Constitution to permit Russia “to apply the full force of its 
military and destroy the armed forces of a foreign state if the goal of 
such an operation is to secure the lives of its compatriots who are 
permanently living abroad.”276  Therefore, the privileged interests 
doctrine applies to several components of the UN legal order discussed 
supra.277  For example, the doctrine broadens the scope of 
humanitarian rescue and humanitarian intervention to ethnic 
Russians in foreign states, especially if those states are “traditional 
partners” with Russia.  Moreover, the privileged interests doctrine 
provides Russia with legal justification for a military invasion of another 




 271  KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 61, ¶ 2 
(Russ.).  
 272  See Lavrov Transcript, supra note 267.  
 273  Toomey, supra note 5, at 474 (citing Andrew E. Kramer & James Kanter, Gas 
Dispute Runs Deeper Than Pipes, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/14/world/europe/14gazprom.html?_r=0); 
Christian Walter, Postscript: Self-Determination, Secession, and the Crimean Crisis 2014, in 
SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293, 307 (2014) 
[hereinafter, Walter Crimea]; see also supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 274  See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 275  Burke-White, supra note 59, at 5. 
 276  Peter Roudik, Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.php (last updated Dec. 
15, 2014).  See Valery Zorkin, [Peace Enforcement and Human Rights], ROSSIYSKAYA 
GAZETA (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/13/zorkin.html. 
 277  See supra Part II. 
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doctrine becomes very important in explaining Russia’s legal 
justifications for unilateral intervention in both Georgia and Ukraine. 
 ii.Self-Defense of Ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia 
As indicated supra, many ethnic Russians and Russian nationals 
resided in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  This is largely due to Russia 
conferring citizenship and providing passports to many South 
Ossetians and Abkhazians during the 1990s.278  In accordance with the 
privileged interests doctrine, Russia asserted its legal right to intervene 
on behalf of the ethnic Russians residing in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.279  On August 8, 2008, Russia called an emergency meeting 
of the Security Council to discuss the situation and called for the 
Security Council to condemn the Georgian attacks.280  Mr. Churkin 
explained that “[m]assive artillery fire [was] being directed against a 
peaceful civilian population, including old people and children, using 
Grad multiple launch systems and large-calibre rocket launchers.”281  
Russia characterized Georgia’s August 7, 2008 attacks upon the 
“peaceful population of South Ossetia” as “treacherous” and 
“criminal.”282  Moreover, Russia claimed that Georgia had similar plans 
to attack Abkhazia.283  Therefore, Russia asserted the right to self-
defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter to protect ethnic 
Russians.284  Russia claims that it continued to use force in self-defense 
until the conditions warranted otherwise.285  Additionally, Russia 
asserted a humanitarian rescue claim to justify the unilateral 
intervention on behalf of South Ossetian and Abkhazian civilians.286 
It is undeniable that Russia breached Georgia’s territorial 
integrity and the norm of non-intervention through its military 
invasion into parts of Georgia.287  Russia attempted to justify its conduct 
 
 278  See supra note 244 and accompanying text.  
 279  See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text. 
 280  See U.N. SCOR, 63th Sess., 5951th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5951 (Aug. 8, 2008). 
 281  See id. at 2. 
 282  See Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 188–89 (discussing Russia’s written 
submission to the fact-finding mission detailing Russia’s factual and legal views upon 
the war with Georgia). 
 283  Id. at 190. 
 284  Id. at 188; Borgen, supra note 12, at 16; Lee, supra note 41, at 291; Toomey, supra 
note 5, at 444, 465. 
 285  See Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 189. 
 286  Lee, supra note 41, at 254, 257.  As detailed supra, humanitarian rescue is a 
subset of the general right of self-defense.  See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying 
text.   
 287  See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 205. 
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by invoking the right to self-defense and humanitarian rescue, a subset 
doctrine under the right to self-defense, as lawful exceptions to 
territorial integrity and the norm of non-intervention.288  The problem, 
however, is that both of these arguments do not pass muster. 
Russia’s actions do not meet the requirements to assert self-
defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter289 for three main reasons: 
(1) no armed attack290 occurred on Russian territory; (2) the right to 
self-defense did not extend to ethnic Russians in Georgia; and (3) 
Russia acted disproportionately.  First, to warrant overriding the 
general prohibition on the use of force, the victim state may only use 
force “to protect the security of a State and its essential rights, in 
particular the rights of territorial integrity and political 
independence.”291  Therefore, the armed attack must rise to a certain 
level of severity for a state to resort to unilateral military action.  An 
attack that was not launched upon or against the victim state’s territory 
will most likely not suffice because no nexus exists between the attack 
and the state’s territory.292  Since Georgia’s attacks upon ethnic 
Russians were conducted within Georgian territory, and therefore did 
not directly threaten the security of the Russian state, Russia may not 
have asserted the right to self-defense. 
Moreover, the danger ethnic Russians faced at the hands of the 
Georgian government could not trigger Russia’s right to self-defense.293  
As described supra, many South Ossetians and Abkhazians received 
Russian citizenship and passports.294  The conferral of Russian 
citizenship, however, cannot justify Russia’s military intervention based 
upon self-defense.295  The European Union’s (EU) Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia affirmed 
this by stating: 
 
 288  See supra Part II for a discussion about the right of self-defense and 
humanitarian rescue. 
 289  See also supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 290  See supra note 45 and accompanying text for the ICJ’s interpretation of what 
constitutes as an armed attack. 
 291  STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1996).  See also G. Nolte & A. Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY vol. II, ¶ 28 (B. Simma et al. eds., 
2012). 
 292  See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 206; see also A. Randelzhofer & O. Dörr, Article 
2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY vol. I, ¶ 58 (B. Simma et 
al. eds., 2012). 
 293  See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 206 (“[I]nternational law does not allow the use 
of force against other states for the protection of one’s own citizens.”). 
 294  See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 295  See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 208. 
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The mass conferral of Russian citizenship to Georgian 
nationals and the provision of passports on a massive scale 
on Georgian territory, including its breakaway provinces, 
without the consent of the Georgian Government runs 
against the principles of good neighborliness and constitutes 
an open challenge to Georgian sovereignty and an 
interference in the internal affairs of Georgia.296 
Thus, even if the right to self-defense applied to attacks conducted 
outside of the victim state, attacks upon ethnic Russians in Georgia did 
not give Russia the right to defend itself. 
Finally, Russia’s claim for self-defense fails because Russia acted 
with a disproportionate amount of force.297  Factors to consider in the 
proportionality analysis include the types of weapons used, the 
duration of the defensive military action, the scope of the operation, 
and the amount of territory covered.298  The defensive military action 
must be “limited and temporary unilateral intervention, [used] only as 
a last resort.”299  Russia not only engaged in a full-scale military invasion 
of not only South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also extended its military 
operations to undisputed Georgian territory.300  Overall, the argument 
that Russia could legally defend ethnic Russians within Georgia does 
not comport with the UN legal order, especially because the failure to 
meet any of the three aforementioned deficiencies quashes Russia’s 
self-defense claim. 
Unlike the discussion regarding self-defense supra, humanitarian 
rescue may be lawfully asserted to protect nationals abroad who face 
imminent death.301  Therefore, an armed attack upon Russian territory 
is not required for Russia to assert that it legally intervened on behalf 
of ethnic Russians abroad in Georgia.  Although Russia’s argument for 
intervention fares better under the humanitarian rescue doctrine, the 
argument still fails for two main reasons: (1) Russia acted 
disproportionately; and (2) the ethnic Russians in Georgia were not 
legally Russian nationals. 
For the same aforementioned reasons that Russia acted 
disproportionately for purposes of asserting a lawful self-defense claim, 
 
 296  Id. (citing Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 18). 
 297  See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 244, at 93–119; Tagliavini Report, supra note 
65, at 21. 
 298  Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 27. 
 299  Nanda, supra note 46.  
 300  See Borgen, supra note 12, at 5; Toomey, supra note 5, at 476.  But see Waters, 
supra note 60, at 219–20 (arguing that Russia acted proportionately because it did not 
invade enough of Georgia proper to delegitimize the defensive action). 
 301  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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Russia also acted disproportionately for purposes of asserting a 
humanitarian rescue claim.302  Additionally, the provision of citizenship 
and passports to ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is 
dubious at best under international law.  Specifically, the 
“passportized” Abkhazians and South Ossetians did not qualify as 
Russian citizens for the purposes of the humanitarian rescue 
doctrine.303  Indeed, the ICJ in the Nottebohm Case noted that the act of 
naturalizing a person with little connection to the naturalizing state 
should not be recognized by another state since it disregards the 
concept of nationality in international relations.304  Because 
humanitarian rescue only applies to the defending state’s citizens, the 
circumstances in Georgia did not warrant humanitarian rescue. 
iii. Humanitarian Intervention in Georgia 
In addition, Russia also asserted that it had a legal right to 
intervene in Georgia based upon humanitarian concerns and R2P.305  
Mr. Lavrov explained that pursuant to the privileged interests 
doctrine, Russia could intervene based upon humanitarian concerns 
and that Russia would protect its people “wherever they are” and “with 
all means available.”306  Russia realizes that after the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, many ethnic Russians found themselves in the minority in the 
newly created states, like Georgia.307  In accordance with this 
realization, Mr. Lavrov wrote: 
We can’t understand why those who are talking about the 
responsibility to protect and about the security of the person 
at every turn, forgot it when it came to the part of the former 
Soviet space where authorities began to kill innocent people, 
appealing to sovereignty and territorial integrity.  For us, the 
issue in South Ossetia was to protect our citizens directly on 
 
 302  Indeed, the proportionality requirement seems to be stricter for humanitarian 
rescue operations.  For example, the 1976 Israeli raid in Entebbe, Uganda entailed 
approximately 200 Israeli troops raiding an airport in Entebbe to rescue 100 hostages 
held by pro-Palestinian hijackers.  The mission lasted thirty-five minutes, killing twenty 
Ugandan soldiers and three hostages in the cross-fire.  See 1976: Israelis Rescue Entebbe 
Hostages, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/4/ 
newsid_2786000/2786967.stm (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).  Therefore, humanitarian 
rescue typically entails small-scale military operations intended only to remove the 
state’s nationals from danger. 
 303  Toomey, supra note 5, at 476. 
 304  See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, ¶¶ 59, 67 (Apr. 6). 
 305  See Borgen, supra note 12, at 16; Lee, supra note 41, at 291; Toomey, supra note 
5, at 444, 465. 
 306  See Lavrov Transcript, supra note 267. 
 307  Borgen, supra note 12, at 19.  
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the borders of Russia, not in the Falkland Islands.308 
Thus, Russia did not assert that it had a broad legal right to intervene 
anywhere in the world based upon humanitarian concerns and R2P, 
but only within the post-Soviet states.  Specifically relating to Georgia, 
Russia argued that the previously aforementioned Georgian attacks on 
civilians, which began on August 7, 2008, amounted to ethnic 
cleansing of South Ossetians.309  Additionally, on August 10, 2008, then-
President Medvedev accused Georgia of committing genocide in South 
Ossetia, and Russia’s Prosecutor’s Office began documenting the 
alleged war crimes for future prosecution.310 
Russia’s claim that it legally intervened in Georgia based upon 
humanitarian concerns and/or R2P hinges upon the same factual 
finding that South Ossetians and Abkhazians faced an extreme amount 
of peril at the hands of the Georgian state right before Russia 
intervened.311  Georgia clearly endangered the lives of its citizens 
during the August 7, 2008 attack in South Ossetia.  As discussed supra, 
Russia argued that Georgia committed ethnic cleansing in South 
Ossetia.312  The EU’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Conflict in Georgia, however, found that genocide did not take 
place despite Russia’s insistence.313  Russia compared the Georgian 
conflict to Kosovo; however, the Kosovo conflict resulted in large-scale 
ethnic cleansing of the Kosovars314 while the situation in Georgia was 
politically rooted, without systemic discrimination against the South 
Ossetians or Abkhazians for their ethnic Russian heritage.315  
Therefore, whether the danger to South Ossetians after Georgia’s 
August 7, 2008 attack warranted R2P or humanitarian intervention is 
ambiguous at best. 
 
 308  Id. at 20 (citing Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov’s Article ‘Russian 
Foreign Policy and a New Quality of the Geopolitical Situation’ for Diplomatic Yearbook 2008, 
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b4325699 
9005bcbb3/bc2150e49dad6a04c325752e0036e93f?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 
23, 2015)). 
 309  See Lee, supra note 41, at 291.  Russia reformulated its perspective on territorial 
sovereignty as based upon the will of the people shown by factual circumstances on 
the ground.  See Borgen, supra note 12, at 20.  In accordance with this perspective, 
Russia argued it was not overlooking Georgia’s territorial integrity, but the 
circumstances in South Ossetia made it very unlikely for South Ossetians to remain 
within Georgia’s sovereign territory.  Id. at 20–21.  
 310  HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 244, at 70.  This same report, however, ultimately 
determined that Georgia was not guilty of genocide.  Id. at 71. 
 311  See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 312  See supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
 313  Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 187. 
 314  See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 196. 
 315  See id. 
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Russia does not have a legal claim for humanitarian intervention 
for one main reason: Russia did not receive Security Council 
authorization to intervene in Georgia.316  Moreover, R2P has not yet 
formed into customary international law.317  Due to R2P’s ambiguous 
status within the UN legal order, it would be very unlikely for a singular 
state to successfully rely upon R2P to justify intervention.  Indeed, R2P 
originally became a part of the UN legal order after having been 
invoked to justify multilateral interventions.318  Even if R2P could be 
seen as a legitimate justification for unilateral intervention, only mass 
atrocities committed against the civilian population may trigger a right 
for foreign intervention.319  The aforementioned circumstances in 
Georgia did not rise to this high threshold.320  Overall, Russia’s 
humanitarian-based arguments do not carry much legal weight. 
 iv.Self-Defense of Russian Peacekeepers 
Finally, Russia argued that it had a legal right to defend the 
Russian peacekeepers stationed in Georgia pursuant to the Sochi 
Agreement.321  During the August 7, 2008 Georgian attack, eighteen 
Russian peacekeeping troops were killed.322  The attack was classified 
as “an act of aggression against Russian peacekeepers.”323  Thus, in 
addition to asserting a claim of self-defense for ethnic Russians, Russia 
also asserted self-defense of its peacekeepers as a legal reason for its 
unilateral intervention in Georgia. 
This is Russia’s strongest legal argument to justify its unilateral 
intervention in Georgia.  Although Russia characterizes its legal 
argument in terms of the general right of self-defense, for reasons 
discussed supra regarding the requirement for an armed attack on the 
defending state’s territory, it is more accurate to categorize Russia’s 
legal argument under the doctrine of humanitarian rescue, a subset of 
 
 316  See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 317  See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 318  See supra Part III stating, however, that Security Council R2P invocation is also 
unlikely to occur because of the veto power held by Russia and China. 
 319  See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT 31 (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.  
 320  Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 195–96 (“These minority groups were not subject 
to acts of genocide or gross violation of human rights.”). 
 321  See South Ossetia Max Planck, supra note 72, at ¶ 29; see also Russia Max Planck, 
supra note 7, at ¶ 30; Waters, supra note 60, at 211. 
 322  Waters, supra note 60, at 206. 
 323  Id. at 195 (quoting Dmitry Medvedev, President of Russ., Statement on the 
Situation in South Ossetia (Aug. 8, 2008), http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/ 
2008/08/08/1553_type82912type82913_205032.shtml).   
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the right to self-defense.324  Indeed, a state may take unilateral action 
to defend its citizens in danger abroad.325  The Russian peacekeepers, 
who were lawfully present in Georgia pursuant to the Sochi 
Agreement, were Russian citizens.  Moreover, it became apparent that 
Russian peacekeepers faced imminent danger after the August 7, 2008 
attack orchestrated by the Georgian government that killed eighteen 
peacekeepers.326  The EU’s Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia found that Russia intervened 
lawfully on behalf of its peacekeepers stationed in South Ossetia.327 
Humanitarian rescue justified Russia’s immediate reaction to 
defend Russian peacekeepers after the August 7, 2008 attack, but it did 
not justify the invasion of Georgia that spilled into Georgia proper.328  
Indeed, the EU’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia stated: 
The Russian reaction to the Georgian attack can be divided 
into two phases: first, the immediate reaction in order to 
defend Russian peacekeepers, and second, the invasion of 
Georgia by Russian armed forces reaching far beyond the 
administrative boundary of South Ossetia.  In the first 
instance, there seems to be little doubt that if the Russian 
peacekeepers were attacked, Russia had the right to defend 
them using military means proportionate to the attack.  
Hence the Russian use of force for defensive purposes during 
the first phase of the conflict would be legal.  On the second 
item, it must be ascertained whether the subsequent Russian 
military campaign deeper into Georgia was necessary and 
proportionate in terms of defensive action against the initial 
Georgian attack.  Although it should be admitted that it is 
not easy to decide where the line must be drawn, it seems, 
however, that much of the Russian military action went far 
beyond the reasonable limits of defense.329 
Therefore, humanitarian rescue of Russian peacekeepers was a 
legitimate justification for the August 8, 2008 intervention, but not for 
Russia’s subsequent full-scale military invasion. 
 
 324  See supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text. 
 325  See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
 326  See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
 327  Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 23; see also Russia Max Planck, supra note 7, 
at ¶ 30. 
 328  Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 23. 
 329  Id. at 23–24. 
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B. Russia’s Unilateral Intervention in Ukraine 
1. The Crimean Crisis 
The fundamental source of the Crimean crisis lies in its unique 
history and relationships with the West and Russia.  Crimea is the only 
Russian-majority province in Ukraine.330  According to census data 
from 2001, 58.5% of Crimea’s population is ethnic Russian, 24.4% is 
Ukrainian, and 12.1% is Crimean Tartars.331  There is a general divide 
within Ukraine: western and central Ukraine largely align with Western 
powers while support for Russia is preeminent in southern and eastern 
Ukraine.332  This east-west divide is based upon cultural differences, 
emotional sentiment, and politics.333 
In 1954, Crimea was “gifted” from the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic to the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic because 
then-General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, 
had strong ties to Ukraine.334  When the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1991, Ukraine gained independence due to its republic status.  It was 
not until 1992 that post-Soviet nationalists began contesting the legality 
of Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine.335  In fact, on May 21, 1992, the Russian 
Duma declared the transfer illegal.336  Only several days prior to this 
declaration, Crimea’s legislature passed an independence resolution 
and scheduled a subsequent referendum for Crimeans to decide the 
peninsula’s future status.337  As a result of these events, Ukraine allowed 
for Crimea to become an autonomous republic with significant 
authority to self-rule within Ukraine.338  Subsequently, in 1997, under 
the direction of then-President Leonid Kuchma, Russia and Ukraine 
 
 330  RAJAN MENON & EUGENE RUMER, CONFLICT IN UKRAINE: THE UNWINDING OF THE 
POST-COLD WAR ORDER 2 (2015).  
 331  Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 295. 
 332  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330. 
 333  See id.; Christian Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis–An International Law Perspective, 74 
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 367 (2014), http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/Marxsen_2014_-
_The_crimea_crisis_-_an_international_law_perspective.pdf. 
 334  See Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 296; see also Krishnadev Calamur, Crimea: A 
Gift to Ukraine Becomes a Political Flash Point, N.P.R (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/02/27/283481587/crimea-a-gift-to-
ukraine-becomes-a-political-flash-point (theorizing that Crimea was “gifted” to 
Ukraine because the transfer marked the 300th-year anniversary of Ukraine’s 
integration into the Russian empire).  
 335  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 3. 
 336  Id.  
 337  Id. at 3–4 (citing Serge Schmemann, Crimean Parliament Votes to Back Independence 
from Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/06/ 
world/crimea-parliament-votes-to-back-independence-from-ukraine.html).  
 338  Id. at 4; Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 296. 
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executed the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Partnership with Russia acknowledging Ukraine’s international 
borders, including Crimea.339  In that same year, the two states 
executed an agreement that allowed Russia to lease a naval base in 
Sevastopol (a port city within Crimea) for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.340 
Although President Kuchma emphasized strengthening ties with 
Russia in his presidential campaign, he also developed relationships 
with the EU and NATO.  For example, in 1997, Ukraine and NATO 
signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership.341  In 2002, President 
Kuchma signed an Action Plan declaring Ukraine’s “long-term goal of 
NATO membership.”342  Moreover, this sentiment was reaffirmed in 
Ukraine’s military policy that further added Ukraine’s commitment to 
becoming a full-fledged member of the EU.343  It was only after the EU 
and NATO made it clear that the organizations did not plan to confer 
membership upon Ukraine anytime soon that President Kuchma 
turned his focus back to fostering ties with Russia.  Specifically, he 
announced that Ukraine was not ready to become a NATO member 
and deleted any reference to NATO membership within the military 
doctrine.344 
The 2004 presidential election within Ukraine illuminated the 
east-west divide within the state.  The two front-runners were Viktor 
Yushchenko, an ethnic Ukrainian who was seen by Russia as an 
advocate for Western integration, and Viktor Yanukovych, an ethnic 
Russian from the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine bordering with 
Russia.345  Yanukovych initially won the election; however, alleged 
election fraud spurred widespread political protests that involved the 
protester occupation of Kiev’s Independence Square.346  These 
protests, which became known as the Orange Revolution, resulted in a 
new election that Yushchenko won with 51.2% of the votes.347  This was 
a strong blow to the pro-Russian region of Ukraine that created 
internal unrest.348 
 
 339  Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 296. 
 340  See Eric Posner, The 1997 Black Sea Fleet Agreement Between Russia and Ukraine, 
ERIC POSNER BLOG (Mar. 5, 2014), http://ericposner.com/. 
 341  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 28. 
 342  See NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, NATO (Nov. 22, 2002), http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19547.htm?.  
 343  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 28. 
 344  Id. at 29. 
 345  See id. at 34. 
 346  See id.  
 347  Id. 
 348  Id. (discussing how some protesters called for merging eastern Ukraine with 
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Much like the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia,349 Western states 
and Western non-governmental organizations supported the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine.350  This did not sit well with Yanukovych and his 
supporters, who rallied against the foreign interference.351  Western 
support displeased Russia as well, especially because it followed a 
similar pattern to the Rose Revolution in Georgia only one year 
earlier.352 
It became clear that President Yushchenko was no Russian ally for 
several reasons.  First, President Yushchenko made integration with the 
EU and NATO a priority.353  Second, he condemned Russia’s unilateral 
intervention in Georgia.354  Yushchenko even offered to send 
Ukrainian troops to a proposed UN peacekeeping force within 
Georgia.355  By the beginning of 2010, however, Yuschenko lost his 
appeal to the Ukrainian people, causing the pendulum to swing back 
in eastern Ukraine’s favor. 
In his second presidential election in 2010, Yanukovych won by 
relying upon Russophone Ukraine for support.356  Yanukovych’s 
presidency soon became associated with corruption.357  The pervasive 
corruption in Ukrainian politics largely caused Yanukovych to turn 
away from signing the Associated Agreement with the EU, despite the 
fact that integration would have greatly boosted Ukraine’s suffering 
economy.358  President Yanukovych’s abrupt order to suspend talks with 
the EU and NATO on November 21, 2013 came as a surprise to 
everyone.359  In the same abrupt fashion, Yanukovych declared he 
would resume negotiations with Russia to join the Eurasian Customs 
Union (CU).360  Following through with EU membership would have 
cut off Yanukovych from Russian support, effectively crippling his 
 
Russia). 
 349  See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 350  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 35. 
 351  Id.  
 352  See id. 
 353  Id. at 39. 
 354  Id. 
 355  See Viktor Yushchenko, Georgia and the Stakes for Ukraine, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/24/ 
AR2008082401856.html.  
 356  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 44. 
 357  See id. at 47. 
 358  See id. at 51. 
 359  Id. at 77. 
 360  Id.  At that time, the Eurasian Customs Union was comprised of Russia, Belarus, 
and Kazakhstan. 
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power and finances.361  Unfortunately for him, this decision provoked 
large-scale unrest in Western Ukraine, which ultimately led to his fall 
from power. 
Many EU officials and Ukrainians were angered with President 
Yanukovych’s sudden withdrawal from negotiations, which led to 
widespread civilian protests throughout Ukraine.362  By December 
2013, protests included more than 800,000 civilians and were 
escalating in violence, spurring protestors to seize Kyiv’s city hall.363  On 
December 10, 2013, Ukrainian police violently attempted to dismantle 
the protesters’ stronghold of Kyiv’s Independence Square, which 
resulted in many civilian casualties that spurred condemnation from 
the international community.364  The violence continued into February 
2014, which influenced the Ukrainian government to sign a 
compromise agreement that provided constitutional reform 
beginning in September 2014 followed by a new presidential 
election.365  Shortly thereafter, President Yanukovych fled from 
Ukraine and sought refuge in Russia, causing the Ukrainian 
Parliament to remove him from office on February 25, 2014.366  The 
pro-Western protesters seemed to have won the battle by ousting the 
pro-Russian regime. 
In response to these events, pro-Russian demonstrations began on 
February 23, 2014 in Crimea.367  Several days later, armed pro-Russian 
protesters seized government buildings in Simferopol, the Crimean 
capital.368  Subsequently, unidentified uniformed troops appeared 
throughout Crimea.369  In the midst of widespread civil unrest between 
the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian protesters, on March 1, 
2014, the Russian Duma authorized President Vladimir Putin to deploy 
Russian troops until conditions in Ukraine normalized.370  As a result 
 
 361  See id. at 51. 
 362  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 78; see also Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 
297. 
 363  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 79. 
 364  Id. 
 365  Id. at 80; Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine - Full Text, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-
settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text.  
 366  MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 81. 
 367  Id. at 83. 
 368  See Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275. 
 369  See id.  Although wholly denied by Russia, reports rumor that Russian military 
intervention began before the referendum occurred.  See Walter Crimea, supra note 273, 
at 302. 
 370  Russian Parliament Approves Troop Deployment in Ukraine, BBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 
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of Russian-supported propaganda classifying the revolution in Ukraine 
as a “Western plot executed by radical Ukrainian nationalists and 
fascist elements,” the majority of Crimeans supported integration with 
Russia.371  On March 16, 2014, an overwhelming amount of voters 
decided to secede from Crimea and reunify with Russia.372  President 
Putin executed a treaty with Crimean officials only two days after 
annexing Crimea and effectively dismembering Ukrainian territory.373 
Following Crimea’s swift annexation, Russia amassed troops on 
the Ukrainian border, threatening military intervention.374  Moreover, 
Russia supplied pro-Russian Ukrainians with weapons and other types 
of logistical support.375  Self-proclaimed republics have been set up in 
other parts of eastern Ukraine, such as Donetsk and Luhansk, 
continuing the violence between the Ukrainian government and pro-
Russian forces.376  In the summer of 2014, Russia sent military supplies 
and personnel to the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk in an effort 
to maintain the Russian strongholds.377  It was not until September 
2014 that the Ukrainian government signed a ceasefire agreement that 
has resulted in a stalemate.378  By February 2015, more than 5400 
people died since the crisis began.379 
2. Russia’s Legal Justifications for Unilateral Intervention 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine ultimately led to its annexation 
of Crimea, effectively dismembering Ukraine’s territory.380  The 
privileged interests doctrine discussed supra is similarly relevant in 
 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26400035. 
 371  MENNON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 84.  
 372  Anna Stepanowa, International Law and the Legality of Secession in Crimea, 
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L COMP. L. ONLINE (Apr. 20, 2014), http://cjicl.org.uk/ 
2014/04/20/international-law-legality-secession-crimea/.  While the referendum was 
held, Russian troops and paramilitary forces were visibly patrolling the streets.  
MENNON & RUMER, supra note 330, at x.  
 373  See Will Englund, Kremlin Says Crimea is Now Officially Part of Russia After Treaty 
Signing, Putin Speech, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/russias-putin-prepares-to-annex-crimea/2014/03/18/933183b2-654e-45ce-
920e-4d18c0ffec73_story.html. 
 374  MENNON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 85. 
 375  Id.  
 376  Id. 
 377  Id. at 86. 
 378  Id. 
 379  Ukraine Conflict: Death Toll Rises Ahead of Peace Talks, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31392473.  
 380  Although the current status of Crimea is controversial, Russia retains de facto 
control of the territory. 
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analyzing Russia’s justifications for intervention in Ukraine.381  Russia 
proffered three primary legal arguments to legitimize the events in 
Ukraine.  This Section will consider whether these justifications pass 
muster under the UN legal order. 
Before analyzing Russia’s legal arguments set forth to legitimize 
its intervention in Ukraine, it is necessary to differentiate the conflict 
from the Russo-Georgian War.  Unlike in Georgia, Russia did not 
execute a full-scale military invasion into Ukraine, but Russia did 
acquire new territory.  In order for the annexation of Crimea to be 
lawful under international law, a specific series of events needed to 
occur.  First, Crimea needed to secede382 from Ukraine so that Russia 
would not violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity by acquiring territory 
through the use of force.383  Second, the newly independent Crimea 
would have had to freely consent to incorporation with Russia without 
any duress.384  If Crimea never became independent from Ukraine, 
Russia’s subsequent action of annexing the territory, and the means it 
took to acquire the territory, were illegal.  This same two-stage process 
was set forth by President Putin in his March 18, 2014 address to 
incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation.385  Therefore, Russia 
not only set forth justifications for intervention, it also asserted legal 
arguments to legitimize Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. 
Whether Russia actually used physical force in Crimea is highly 
disputed.  Russia wholly denies that Russian military forces entered 
Crimea (besides the forces already lawfully stationed in Sevastopol386) 
before Crimea’s purportedly lawful secession.387  Nonetheless, some 
reports indicated the opposite, stating that Russian military personnel 
were already in Crimea before the secession referendum occurred.388  
 
 381  See supra notes 266–77 and accompanying text. 
 382  See supra Part II. 
 383  Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39 (“The territory of a State shall not 
be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force.  
No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized 
as legal.”).   
 384  See id. 
 385  Putin’s Speech, supra note 8. 
 386  During the Crimean conflict, Russia admitted to increasing the number of 
armed forces in Sevastopol, but allegedly did not violate the 25,000-troop maximum 
set by the Black Sea Fleet Agreement.  Id. 
 387  See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 388  See Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 302; see also Fredrik Dahl, OSCE Team Say 
Crimea Roadblock Gunmen Threatened to Shoot at Them, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-ukraine-crisis-osce-
idUSBREA2B1C120140312; Steven Erlanger, Ukrainian Government Rushes to Dampen 
Secessionist Sentiment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/03/03/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0. 
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If these reports are true, Russia violated the prohibition on the use of 
force codified by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and must successfully 
assert an exception to this rule (like self-defense) to legally justify the 
intervention.389 
Regardless, the threat of the use of force is prohibited under 
Article 2(4), and member states may not intervene in the domestic 
affairs of other states.390  On March 1, 2014, the Russian Duma 
authorized President Putin to deploy Russian military units to Crimea 
to stabilize the unrest within the peninsula.391  The authorization 
represented a clear threat of force despite the fact that Russia never 
mounted a full-scale military invasion.392  Moreover, Russia violated the 
principle of non-intervention because the “prohibition of intervention 
also applies to premature forms of recognition of secessionist 
movements in terms of separate statehood.”393  Specifically, Russia’s 
conduct provided material support for Crimea’s secession through the 
March 1st authorization to use force and the political support given to 
the Crimean separatists.  After Crimea’s purported annexation, Russia 
continued to violate the norm of non-intervention.  In Nicaragua v. 
United States, the ICJ held that the United States breached the norm of 
non-intervention by supplying the Nicaraguan rebel forces with arms 
and logistical support.394  Thus, Russia’s provision of weapons and 
logistical support to pro-Russian forces within Ukraine similarly 
violated the norm of non-intervention.395  The legal position adopted 
by Russia to justify its actions in Crimea also seeks to assert exceptions 
to the norm of non-intervention. 
The first sub-part of this Section will discuss Russia’s claim that it 
intervened on behalf of ethnic Russians in Crimea.  In addition, the 
second sub-part explains Russia’s assertion that it received consent 
 
 389  See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 390  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 391  See supra note 370 and accompanying text. 
 392  See Putin’s Speech, supra note 8 (“True, the President of the Russian Federation 
received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces in 
Ukraine.  However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet.”).  
Unlike the situation in Kosovo, where almost an entire decade elapsed between the 
violence in 1999 and the 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, in Crimea, 
only several days expired between the March 1, 2014 threat of the use of force and the 
annexation agreement on March 18, 2014.  Therefore, Crimea’s change in status was 
much more directly connected to Russia’s conduct. 
 393  Stefan Oeter, The Role of Recognition and Non-Recognition with Regard to Secession, 
in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 44, 51 (Christian Walter ed., 2014). 
 394  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 116–17, ¶ 247 (June 27).  
 395  MENNON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 85. 
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from the Ukrainian government.  Finally, the third sub-part will 
address Russia’s invocation of self-determination to support its 
intervention in Crimea. 
 i.Self-Defense of Ethnic Russians in Crimea 
Similar to Russia’s legal position in Georgia, Russia argues that it 
acted in lawful self-dense of ethnic Russians located within Crimea.396  
In the context of the Russian Duma’s authorization of the use of force 
in Crimea, the Duma Chairperson, Valentina Matviyenko, asserted that 
there was “a real threat to the life and security of Russian citizens living 
in Ukraine.”397  Additionally, the Chairperson stressed the significance 
of taking “all possible measures, to ensure the security of our citizens 
living in Ukraine.”398  In President Putin’s March 18, 2014 speech to 
the Duma, he asserted: 
Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in 
Ukraine and will continue to do so.  Russia will always defend 
their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means.  
But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure 
that these people’s rights and interests are fully protected.  
This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and 
territorial integrity.399 
Russia’s self-defense argument fails to comport with the UN legal 
order for two main reasons: (1) no armed attack occurred on Russian 
territory; and (2) self-defense may not be invoked for ethnic Russians 
living abroad.  The reasoning for why the claim of self-defense fails is 
similar to the reasoning discussed supra for Georgia.  First, the conflict 
in Ukraine did not threaten the existence or security of the Russian 
state, nor did it concern Russian territory.400  Moreover, the protection 
of ethnic Russians may not trigger the right to self-defense.401 
Russia also asserted a humanitarian rescue claim to justify its 
intervention in Ukraine.402  Similar to the outcome in Georgia, Russia’s 
argument for humanitarian rescue also fails since ethnic Russians in 
Ukraine are not considered legal Russian nationals.  As with Russia’s 
“passportization” in Georgia, it is believed that Russia conferred 
 
 396  See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 3–4; Marxsen, supra note 333, at 372. 
 397  Putin’s Letter on Use of Russian Army in Ukraine Goes to Upper House, TASS (Mar. 1, 
2014), http://tass.ru/en/russia/721586.  
 398  Id.  
 399  Putin’s Speech, supra note 8. 
 400  See supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text. 
 401  See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
 402  See Lee, supra note 41, at 253, 257; Marxsen, supra note 333, at 374. 
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passports and citizenship to Ukrainians in the past several years.403  In 
addition to constituting interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs,404 
the ICJ has warned that naturalizing a person with little connection to 
the naturalizing state should not receive recognition in other states.405 
A successful claim for humanitarian rescue requires the state’s 
citizens to be facing imminent death.406  During his address, President 
Putin expressed concern over the coup d’état in Kyiv that led 
Yanukovych to flee into Russia.407  Specifically, President Putin stated: 
However, those who stood behind the latest events in 
Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet 
another government takeover; they wanted to seize power 
and would stop short of nothing.  They resorted to terror, 
murder and riots.  Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and 
anti-Semites executed this coup.  They continue to set the 
tone in Ukraine to this day.408 
Despite President Putin’s assertions, no evidence exists that ethnic 
Russians in Crimea were in imminent peril.409  Therefore, Russia’s legal 
position rooted in self-defense does not meet the UN legal order’s 
parameters to justify the threat on the use of force or violation of the 
norm of non-intervention. 
 ii.Intervention by Invitation 
Russia also argues that it had the legal right to intervene in 
Ukraine because it received Ukraine’s consent through President 
Yanukovych.410  Russian authorities assert that after Yanukovych fled 
Ukraine as a result of the political unrest, he wrote a letter asking 
Russia to intervene in Ukraine against the alleged anti-Semite and 
nationalist protesters.411  According to the ICJ, the official government 
 
 403  See Vincent M. Artman, Opinion, Annexation by Passport, ALJAZEERA AM. (Mar. 14, 
2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/ukraine-russia-crimea 
passportizationcitizenship.html; Charles King, Opinion, Crimea, the Tinderbox, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/opinion/crimea-the-
tinderbox.html?module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Opinion&action=keypress&
region=FixedLeft&pgtype=article.  
 404  See supra note 296 and accompanying text (concluding that Russia’s 
“passportization” policy interfered in Georgia’s internal affairs). 
 405  See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, ¶¶ 59, 67 (Apr. 6). 
 406  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 407  See supra notes 363–66 and accompanying text. 
 408  Putin’s Speech, supra note 8. 
 409  See Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 309; see also Marxsen, supra note 333, at 374. 
 410  Marxsen, supra note 333, at 374. 
 411  Id.; Scott Neuman, Yanukovych: ‘I Was Wrong’ to Ask Russian Troops into Crimea, 
N.P.R. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/04/02/ 
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of a state may invite foreign states to deploy military troops to its 
territory, but an opposition group may not.412  In order to assert such a 
claim, Russia must show that Ukraine lawfully consented to 
intervention. 
Russia must also demonstrate that Yanukovych had legitimate 
authority to request Russian intervention to make his invitation 
attributable to the state of Ukraine.413  As a preliminary matter, 
Yanukovych’s removal from office failed to comply with the Ukrainian 
Constitution, which codifies removal procedures.414  Nevertheless, 
Yanukovych lacked the authority to consent to Russian intervention 
because at the time of his invitation, he had already lost effective 
control over Ukraine and lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many 
Ukrainians.415  Alternatively, even if Yanukovych possessed the required 
authority to consent to Russian intervention, Russia’s argument still 
fails because the intervention far exceeded the scope of Yanukovych’s 
invitation.416  Russia made no attempt to re-establish Yanukovych’s 
regime and instead supported Crimea’s secession. 
 iii.Russia’s Invocation of Self-Determination 
Finally, Russia justified its intervention in Ukraine by broadly 
interpreting the principle of self-determination to legitimize Crimea’s 
secession from Ukraine.417  As indicated above, self-determination is 
one of the main principles of the UN legal order418 and gives a “people” 
the right to freely “determine . . . their political status and to pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”419  When the right 
to self-determination is frustrated, a people may secede under certain 
circumstances.  Two generally agreed upon circumstances include the 
colonial context and a people under foreign subjugation.420  Some 
argue that when a parent state systemically violates a people’s right to 
self-determination, a people are entitled to remedial secession.421  For 
example, remedial secession may be appropriate when the parent state 
 
298385578/yanukovych-i-was-wrong-to-ask-russian-troops-into-crimea. 
 412  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 116, ¶ 246 (June 27). 
 413  See Marxsen, supra note 333, at 374–75. 
 414  CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE art. 108 (Uk.). 
 415  See Marxsen, supra note 333, at 377. 
 416  Id.  
 417  See Putin’s Speech, supra note 8. 
 418  See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.  
 419  Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39.  
 420  See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 421  See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 3. 
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commits systemic crimes against humanity or genocide against a 
people.422  A large amount of controversy surrounds remedial 
secession, however, so its status under international law remains 
unclear.423  Nevertheless, Russia asserted that the new Ukrainian 
government systemically oppressed Crimeans, therefore leading 
Crimea to effectuate lawful remedial secession.424 
In legitimizing Crimea’s secession under international law, 
President Putin argued that it was “practically impossible to fight 
against the will of the people.”425  Russia argued that the Crimeans were 
subjected to large-scale oppression by the new Ukrainian government, 
characterizing its new members as “neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-
Semites.”426  To illustrate this point, President Putin spoke about a draft 
law to revise language policies in Ukraine that aimed to infringe upon 
the Russian minority within the state.427  Moreover, President Putin 
explained that anyone who opposed the new Ukrainian government 
was “threatened with repression” and that Russia could not “abandon 
Crimea and its residents in distress.”428  Finally, Russia asserted that 
Crimeans made a free, fair, and transparent choice to secede from 
Ukraine and join Russia.429  For the purposes of this Comment, it will 
be assumed that Crimeans qualify as a “people.”430 
As aforementioned, remedial secession may not be a valid avenue 
for secession under international law.  Assuming, however, that 
remedial secession comports with the UN legal order, the 
circumstances in Crimea were nowhere near the high threshold 
needed to assert such an extraordinary remedy.431  The Ukrainian 
Constitution provided a relatively significant degree of political 
autonomy.432  Indeed, the right to self-determination is commonly 
satisfied through federalism and by breaking a state into provinces with 
 
 422  Id. 
 423  Indeed, only three instances of remedial secession appear in recent state 
practice including: the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002; the independence of 
Kosovo in 2008; and the creation of South Sudan in 2011.  Id.  All of these cases shared 
some level of UN involvement.  
 424  See id. at 6; Putin’s Speech, supra note 8. 
 425  Putin’s Speech, supra note 8.  
 426  Id. 
 427  Id. 
 428  Id.  
 429  Burke-White, supra note 59, at 6. 
 430  See supra note 55 and accompanying text for the most commonly cited 
definition of a “people.” 
 431  See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 7; Marxsen, supra note 333, at 383. 
 432  See supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
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varying degrees of autonomy.433  More significantly, the Ukrainian 
government did not systemically oppress Crimeans.434  Ukraine did not 
commit large-scale genocide or ethnic cleansing against Crimeans to 
warrant the dismemberment of its territory.435  Therefore, the conflict 
did not meet the standard required for remedial secession.  Since 
Crimea failed to legally secede from Ukraine, Russia’s subsequent 
annexation is illegal. 
C. Commonalities Between Russia’s Legal Rhetoric in Georgia and 
Ukraine 
Although the series of events in Georgia and Ukraine are distinct, 
Russia’s legal arguments for intervention share several common 
features.  Drawing commonalities between the two conflicts will shed 
light on Russia’s overall legal position towards foreign intervention 
without state consent.  As indicated supra, Russia’s legal justifications 
for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine largely fail legal analysis 
measuring compliance with the UN legal order.  Nevertheless, Russia’s 
legal arguments to justify intervention are facially grounded in 
international law and the UN legal order specifically.436  The fact that 
Russia’s legal justifications comport with the UN legal order on the 
surface is still significant to the analysis. 
Generally, states conform to international law, but maintain 
differing perspectives on the same legal rules.437  Russia interprets the 
UN legal order in such a way as to serve its material interests.  Often, 
“states cloak their actions in legalese to foster reputations of being 
lawful actors  . . . . A reputation for compliance with international law 
is valuable because it allows states to make more credible promises to 
other states.”438  Therefore, it is often too risky to unilaterally intervene 
in a non-consenting foreign state without any legal support.439  It is 
likely that this logic weighs upon Russian decision-makers, and this 
desire to ground its actions in international law influences Russia’s 
legal perspective on intervention.  Consistency of behavior is 
important in the international community,440 so Russia’s overall legal 
stance on foreign intervention may adapt to justify actions taken to 
 
 433  Oeter, supra note 393, at 55. 
 434  See Marxsen, supra note 333, at 383. 
 435  See generally Burke-White, supra note 59, at 8. 
 436  See id. at 2. 
 437  See VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2007). 
 438  Borgen, supra note 12, at 28 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 439  See LOWE, supra note 437, at 21. 
 440  Id. at 23. 
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further Russia’s self-interest.441 
A good example of Russia morphing its legal perspective to reflect 
its material interest is the use of the privileged interests doctrine.  
Pursuant to the doctrine, Russia “pay[s] particular attention to the 
traditional partners of the Russian Federation.”442  In line with this 
belief, Russia argues that its general right of self-defense applies to 
protect Russian nationals abroad as if the Russian homeland itself were 
under attack.443  Moreover, the argument that Russia may intervene to 
rescue ethnic Russians in a foreign state also derives from the 
privileged interests doctrine.444  Russia asserted these arguments to 
justify its intervention in Georgia and Ukraine despite the differing 
factual circumstances of each conflict.  Since the privileged interests 
doctrine has been incorporated into the Russian legal perspective on 
intervention, it is highly likely that Russia will continue to assert the 
same legal claims for future interventions in “fraternal” states. 
As previously discussed in Part IV, another common theme 
between Russia’s legal justifications for Georgia and Ukraine is the use 
of Kosovo conflict as precedent.445  Russia recited the ICJ’s holding in 
the Kosovo Advisory Opinion which stated that no prohibition on 
declarations of independence exist under international law.446  In 
President Putin’s March 18, 2014 address he asked: 
We keep hearing from the United States and Western 
Europe that Kosovo is some special case.  What makes it so 
special in the eyes of our colleagues?  It turns out that it is 
the fact that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many 
human casualties.  Is this a legal argument?  The ruling of 
the International Court says nothing about this.  This is not 
even double standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt 
cynicism.  One should not try so crudely to make everything 
suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and 
black tomorrow.  According to this logic, we have to make 




 441  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 442  See supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text. 
 443  See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 444  See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 445  Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 437–38, ¶ 81 (July 22).  See also supra 
notes 222–23 and accompanying text. 
 446  See Putin’s Speech, supra note 8; see also Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra 
note 223. 
 447  See Putin’s Speech, supra note 8.  
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In fact, the Crimean Declaration of Independence cites the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion as legal authority for independence from Ukraine.448  
Despite the fact that Russia vehemently opposed Kosovar 
independence, Russia incorporated the outcome into its legal rhetoric 
justifying unilateral intervention in Georgia and Ukraine because it 
suited Russia’s material interest. 
Finally, another area of overlap between Russia’s legal rhetoric in 
Georgia and Ukraine relates to potential NATO expansion in both 
states.  In addition to asserting that Russia has the right to intervene 
on behalf of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union states, the 
privileged interests doctrine also implicates Russia as the regional 
guarantor of security.449  As discussed supra, Russia feels threatened by 
eastward NATO expansion.  After NATO announced its plans to 
incorporate Georgia and Ukraine, Russia did not shy away from voicing 
its strong objections.450  In addition to NATO enlargement being 
perceived as a security threat to Russia, it also represents the weakening 
of Russian authority in its own backyard.451  Thus, for the most part, 
Russia wants to keep NATO (and its member states) out of its region 
of interest.  This is illustrated by Russia’s veto of a 2009 draft Security 
Council resolution extending the mandate for the United Nations 
Observer Mission in Georgia.452  Russia found the draft resolution 
“clearly unacceptable” because it would include foreign peacekeepers 
in Georgia as opposed to Russia’s formerly unilateral peacekeeping 
control.453  Therefore, Russia has a general distaste for Western 
encroachment into its area of privileged interests and will take the 








 448  Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 299. 
 449  See Borgen, supra note 12, at 19.  
 450  See Mearsheimer, supra note 7, at 79. 
 451  See id. at 77 (“Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed 
NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not 
stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion.”). 
 452  Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution 
Extending Mandate of Georgia Mission for 2 Weeks, as Russian Federation Votes 
against Text, U.N. Press Release SC/9681 (June 15, 2009). 
 453  See id. 
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VI. RUSSIA’S OVERALL COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN LEGAL 
ORDER AND ITS CONTRADICTORY LEGAL POSITION 
REGARDING FOREIGN INTERVENTION 
State adherence to the UN legal order is important to maintain 
international peace and security.  Compliance with the UN legal order 
allows states to generally predict how other states will behave.454  States 
that do not conform to the UN legal order often face the 
consequences:  “There is likely to be a price to be paid for violations; 
and it is not easy to foresee when and where that price will be exacted.  
In most cases it is preferable to obey the law and sleep soundly.”455  
Therefore, it is no surprise that Russia’s justifications for intervention 
in Georgia and Ukraine are based upon international law and the UN 
legal order.456 
Facially, Russia’s legal arguments to legitimize its breach of the 
prohibition on the use of force and the norm of non-intervention in 
Georgia and Ukraine conform to the UN legal order.  For example, in 
both conflicts, Russia asserted the right to self-defense, codified by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.  Also, the promotion of human rights is 
listed as a purpose of the UN legal order in Article 1; thus, Russia 
classified its actions as humanitarian in nature, thereby complying with 
its obligations under Article 56 of the UN Charter to further the 
purposes of the UN.  Further, Russia relied upon one of the UN legal 
order’s founding principles of self-determination to support Crimean 
independence.  These arguments are driven by Russia’s self-interest 
and its unique perspective on the UN legal order created in 
furtherance of such interests.  The fact that Russia proffered these 
legal arguments to support its intervention indicates that Russia 
attaches some value to conformance with the UN legal order457 and 
desires to foster an image of being a lawful actor within the 
international system.458 
As indicated in Part V, although Russia’s legal arguments set forth 
to justify intervention in Georgia and Ukraine seem to comply with the 
UN legal order on a surface level, deeper legal analysis yields opposite 
results.  The majority of these arguments fails under closer scrutiny 
and does not meet the required legal parameters pursuant to the UN 
legal order.  The potential exception to this conclusion is Russia’s 
assertion that it acted in self-defense of its peacekeepers stationed in 
 
 454  See LOWE, supra note 437, at 20. 
 455  Id. at 23. 
 456  See Burke-White, supra note 59. 
 457  See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text. 
 458  See Borgen, supra note 12, at 28.   
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South Ossetia.459  Therefore, Russia’s stance on intervention in Georgia 
and Ukraine falls outside of the UN legal order in that regard.  This 
does not mean, however, that Russia is a rogue state within the 
international system that pays no regard to the UN legal order.  The 
fact of the matter is, much like other great powers, Russia interprets 
international law and the UN legal order in its own way.  In this 
particular instance, though, Russia’s perspective on the state of the law 
for foreign intervention does not pass muster. 
Russia’s legal perspective upon foreign intervention in the 
Security Council, however, is a different story.  Seemingly, there is a 
night and day difference between the Russia that unilaterally 
intervened in Georgia and Ukraine, and the Russia that adopts a more 
conservative approach within the Security Council.  Using the recent 
conflicts in Libya and Syria, Part III discussed how Russia generally 
disfavors foreign intervention.  As a P5 Member, Russia shows great 
deference for state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, and 
territorial integrity.460  Generally, Russia objects to foreign intervention 
without host state consent and, further, adopts the belief that foreign 
intervention often exacerbates domestic unrest.461  Moreover, Russia 
seems to strictly adhere to the UN Charter in believing that the Security 
Council is the only body with the authority to order intervention in the 
domestic affairs of member states.462 
Russia’s voting behavior in the context of Libya and Syria 
illustrated its conservative approach.  For example, Russia became very 
displeased with the regime change effectuated by NATO intervention 
in Libya.  Russia expressed its belief that Western states used the norms 
underlying international humanitarian law and R2P as a pretext for 
political goals.463  Russia’s dissatisfaction with the outcome in Libya 
translated into an even more conservative legal perspective upon 
intervention in Syria.  In justifying its vetoes for several draft 
resolutions addressing the growing violence in the Syrian civil war, 
Russia emphasized Syria’s territorial integrity and the principle of non-
intervention.464 
Russia’s legal stance in the Security Council and its legal 
arguments set forth to justify intervention in Georgia and Ukraine are 
in clear contradiction.  As a P5 Member, Russia champions the 
 
 459  See supra notes 321–29 and accompanying text. 
 460  See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 461  See supra notes 144 & 146 and accompanying text. 
 462  See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 463  See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 464  See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, but did not 
afford Georgia and Ukraine the same level of deference.  Russia’s 
contradictory legal positions display the nuance in Russia’s overall 
perspective on foreign intervention and the UN legal order itself. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Comment concludes that Russia’s legal position within the 
Security Council most accurately reflects its general legal stance 
towards foreign intervention.  This general legal stance, however, 
changes when conflicts arise in Russia’s backyard.  As evinced by the 
privileged interests doctrine, Russia feels closely connected to post-
Soviet states.  Russia’s legal positions for intervening in Georgia and 
Ukraine stem from its belief that it has a sovereign right to maintain 
stability within the region.  Indeed, Russia possesses a need to maintain 
regional power, thereby influencing its perspective upon the UN legal 
order and foreign intervention. 
Understanding Russia’s legal perspective on intervention is 
significant because of Russia’s P5 status within the Security Council.  
The Security Council is comprised of diverse states with varying 
political agendas.  The Security Council’s efficacy is largely dependent 
upon the goodwill of other states and the ability of its diverse members 
to come to collective decisions.  Since Russia is an influential decision-
maker within the Security Council, knowing the circumstances in 
which Russia is more (or less) likely to support intervention becomes 
valuable in predicting future Security Council action.  Without 
understanding the reasons behind Russia’s voting behavior and 
foreign policy goals, other Security Council members will face great 
difficulty in working with Russia to effectuate collective action. 
As discussed above, Russia exhibits relatively high sensitivity to 
unrest in its near abroad.  Thus, it is more likely that Russia will 
continue to unilaterally intervene in the domestic affairs of its 
neighboring states and will block any potential Security Council 
intervention in those states.  Unfortunately for Ukraine, this means 
that the Security Council will not be coming to its aid to repel the 
illegal Russian intervention.  At the same time, however, Russia is likely 
to maintain its conservative approach towards Security Council 
intervention when it involves other regional conflicts, such as the 
conflict in Syria.  Russia’s conservative approach may partly be 
explained by Russia’s desire to keep other foreign powers out of its 
area of privileged interests.  The more rigorously Russia defends 
territorial integrity and the norm of non-intervention, the less likely it 
becomes that other states will intervene through collective Security 
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Council action.  Therefore, Russia’s legal perspective on the 
components of the UN Legal Order identified in Part II is both 
reflective of Russia’s legal interpretation of international law and its 
material interests. 
 
 
 
